

BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: William F. Quinn

William F. Quinn was born in Rochester, New York in 1919. He was educated at Saint Louis University High School and Saint Louis University.

He served four years in the U.S. Naval Reserve, and graduated from Harvard University in 1947. For the next ten years he practiced law with the Robertson, Castle and Anthony.

Hawai'i's last Republican governor, Quinn was appointed in 1957 and became the state's first elected governor in 1959. He served until 1962 and then returned to private practice with Quinn & Moore.

Quinn was the president of Dole Company from 1965 to 1972. He became a senior partner at Goodsell Anderson and Quinn in 1972.

Tape No. 17-1-1-88

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

William F. Quinn (WQ)

February 11, 1988

Honolulu, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. (DT)

Joy Chong: The following is an interview with William Quinn. It took place on February 11, 1988. The interviewers were Chris Conybeare and Dan Tuttle. The interview took place in William Quinn's office.

DT: Governor, if we may, I would like to start from the beginning. As I was going over your biographical data, I discovered that—I'd sort of been under the impression you'd been born in Saint Louis [Missouri]. But here, I find out you're born in Rochester [New York]. I always connected you with Saint Louis. What about it?

WQ: Well, I always connected myself with Saint Louis too, Dan. I was born in Rochester [on July 13, 1919], but I was a mere tot when we left, I think two or three years old. And we moved to Saint Louis and lived there until I finished college and got into law school and went to war. And I never really lived there [Rochester] since.

DT: Your father had been in what business?

WQ: My father [Charles Alvin Quinn] was in the leather business. My [older] brother was born in Wilmington, Delaware, because that was a center of shoe and leather, and then Rochester became one and increasingly Saint Louis became a major center, and he moved with the industry. It's curious and interesting, but when I did become governor, appointed by President [Dwight] Eisenhower [in August, 1957], I got a call from a Rochester newspaper and they had a big headline about 'local boy appointed governor (laughs) of Hawai'i.' And as I say, I haven't lived there except for the first two or three years of my life.

DT: Biggest splash in Saint Louis, maybe.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: Can you fill us in a little bit on your early years in Saint Louis, grammar school, high school?

WQ: Yes.

DT: Were you involved in politics, running for office then, or not?

WQ: I was not particularly at that time. I went to public schools, grammar school. And for some reason or other, I skipped a grade, so I was always a little younger than some of my colleagues. And when I went to high school, I learned to become acquainted with girls, and that was somewhat my undoing in that I was called before the principal three or four times. “You’re supposed to be able to do thus and so in your academic work according to all reports and you’re only doing thus and so,” and I finally became sufficiently aware of that, that I approached my mother—my dad was entirely a public school man—that I approached my mother [Elizabeth (Dorrit) Quinn] about going to a boys’ school, a Jesuit school. I had some friends there. And so we worked it out. I don’t think Dad learned [about] it for a few months. So I went to that school and it was a great improvement. But because I hadn’t taken the two years of Greek that was required, why, they put me back one year, so I entered the junior year there again but was taking some senior subjects. I finished that year and went back for a couple of weeks the next year, and all my friends were gone. So I worked it out, after some negotiations.

I tried to get into the college [Saint Louis University]. The college of liberal arts would have nothing to do with me because I hadn’t had the necessary things that they thought (I should have had: fourth year of high school. However, I did get into) the school of commerce and finance, provided I took a tutored course in fourth-year English. I did that, but I also [was] taking commerce courses where they graded you, I guess, on whether you smeared the red ink when you were making these various financial papers (chuckles) and so forth, and they had an English course on how to write a business letter. Finally I said, “I can’t do this anymore.” And I went over and (talked my way) into the college of arts and sciences provided I went to summer school to make up a lot of things. So I went to summer school every year I was in college, but I did graduate on time. And luckily I graduated summa cum laude.

DT: This was at Saint Louis University?

WQ: Saint Louis University.

DT: Mm hmm. And after that you went on to Harvard [University Law School], did you . . .

WQ: Yes, actually, what happened there—gosh, I haven’t thought of these things for a long time, Dan.

(Laughter)

WQ: I decided in the spring of my senior year that I’d like to try to be a lawyer. I had heard about some of the better law schools, and the school that really appealed to me was Yale [University]. Because Yale in those days, as I had learned, would take maybe 150 into the graduating class—into the opening class, first-year class—and out of that maybe 140 would graduate, whereas Harvard was known for taking 600 and graduating 400. So I actually took a qualifying exam in the office of a lawyer in Saint Louis, and I was passed and admitted to Yale. And then I was just about to go off to summer stock—as you know I used to do a little theater—and I got talking to my dad and he said, “Well, I talked to (some) people downtown (about law school).” Of course, he didn’t know the first thing about the profession of law, but he said, “People I talked to downtown said if you’re going to practice in Saint Louis, you (have) to go to (either) Harvard or Missou [University of Missouri].” So he said, “If you

want to go to law school at my expense, that's what you're going to do." So after all (the effort of getting into) Yale, I went to Harvard. And I went there and finished the first year, went back for part of the second year, and along came Pearl Harbor. I didn't go back after Pearl Harbor because I wanted to serve my country, I guess.

And about that time, a close friend of mine, (who) had been in the navy for a while says, "Well, don't just enlist," he said—he was in officer recruitment—"Come on in, we must have something for you." And so I went and I interviewed for something called an AVS, aviation specialty. Meantime, I went to the air force (particularly), I wanted to fly. My eyes were so bad, they wouldn't let me. I couldn't even be a bombardier. But I heard nothing from this (AVS) navy thing. And I was just about to go to Jefferson Barracks (to enlist in the army), in mid-February, because my father was furious that I hadn't gone back to law school, (particularly) 'cause I had a deferment. I was disinherited as far as he was concerned (chuckles).

So I decided I would go down and enlist. My brother was getting married in Birmingham, Alabama, and he said, "Well, before you enlist, come down (and) be my best man." While I was down there, I get a wire from this (navy) friend of mine, he (said) they're redoing all (the AVS) applications, come on back. It seemed that [newspaper columnist] Drew [Andrew Russell] Pearson had looked into this particular program. It was set up by somebody in New York. One of the major brokers had been able to get the navy to do this for aviation administrators and they were just taking in one after another of their buddies and giving them commissions. Most of them were about thirty-five years old and here I was twenty(-two). So at any rate, (I) had a re-interview. Then I didn't hear anything. And so I said, "Well, the heck with it. I'll go back to law school and come what may."

So I went back to law school, got there a couple days before Easter vacation. I stayed, I borrowed the notebooks of a couple of friends while they went away. One of them was a guy—Jimmy Wilson, from Atlanta—[who] had the top grades at Harvard Law School. I think he exceeded Justice [Louis D.] Brandeis. I think the top grade still. At any rate, I had his notebooks and (those of) one other (friend). And I'm working and I finally got up to speed just about the time school started again. I knew that I would be able to handle it. And it was only a few days [before school started] when I had a call from my father. He said, "I have a telegram here for Ensign William Quinn." (Chuckles)

And I said, "Read it."

And it said, "Report immediately to Great Lakes Naval Training Station as assistant aviation aide to Com 9." (Laughs) I was flabbergasted, you know, because I hadn't talked to anybody in the navy about that. So I go back, (and went) up to Chicago. I knew so little about the navy. It was a hot day in April, I guess, and I had a plaid suit on and a little badge that said 'Ensign Quinn,' (chuckles) and I checked in at the main gate and I had two bags. They gave me a guide, some seaman, to take me up the other end of the walk about, I don't know, a mile, to report in there. And so I indicate to the seaman, here's a couple bags. "Oh," he said, "Sir, we're not allowed to carry bags." (Chuckles) So I walked following him carrying these two bags, which of course was phoney. But any rate, so that's how I got into the navy.

I stayed there in Chicago for a little while and Nancy [(Witbeck) Quinn] and I got married thinking that we'd come back. I was sent down (to Peru, Indiana) because I had one year of

law school training. They thought I'd be a good one to be getting leases of auxiliary fields for primary aviation training. So I went down there—lovely town, lovely people—and I was the only single young naval officer they'd ever seen. And I was (wearing) those new khaki (uniforms) at that time and, gosh I (became) a member of every club. So when they heard I'm getting married, these lovely people in the Peru-Kokomo area, found a house with a garden, three bedrooms, fifty bucks a month, for me and my bride.

DT: This was 1940 . . .

WQ: This was 1942.

DT: Two, mm hmm.

WQ: I go back to get married and while I'm back there for my [wedding], I get a wire from Chicago, "Report back immediately to Chicago." So I never lived in that—Nancy and I never lived in that lovely house. Went back and then we were living in [a] one-bedroom, Murphy bed apartment, and that sort of thing. [They] set up a whole new organization in the navy and I was the only young officer there. I mean, we had an admiral and a captain, a commander and me to start with. So I had a very responsible job and I enjoyed it to the fullest as personnel officer and that sort of thing. I was able eventually to write my own orders to go to air combat intelligence school and then go overseas.

CC: And all this time, politics really wasn't part of what you did?

WQ: No. I'll tell you, as a matter of fact, we came back [to Harvard] after the war to finish law school, finished within a year because they had that accelerated program. And I'll never forget. I'd got an offer, I went on a trip in November of that year, I'd been in the navy for four years and overseas for (a) couple. Came back, and so [we] were in Cambridge again, Nancy and I, and we had two children and the third (was) on the way. The first was born before I left to go overseas. The second was conceived before I left to go overseas and I didn't meet him until he was over two years old. (Chuckles) But any rate, we were back there and I'm on this trip between semesters. I was going to be a big city lawyer, and I had appointments in Saint Louis, my hometown, New York, Chicago, and Washington. I went to Saint Louis first. And I'm there and I'm finding that nobody's going to offer anybody, no matter where he is in the class—and I was pretty high up in mine—more than \$250 a month. And no way I could tap my father for any additional revenues.

So about this time (Nancy called me about a cable) from Hawai'i. And it (was) from [J.] Garner Anthony, then a distinguished lawyer here. And they're making me an offer of about maybe \$100 more. I had interviewed [with] him back there in Cambridge (not to get a job, but to practice before my interviews with Mainland firms). When Nancy called me and read me this message, I said, "Well what else is new?" And she started to tell me about that terrible weather in Boston and Cambridge and about these little children out playing in their snowsuits and they (got) dirty and they (got) wet in that slushy snow, and they'd have to tinkle and they'd come on in and they'd take their snowsuits off. And she started going on like only a pregling [pregnant woman] can do, you know, and she was about seven months (pregnant) at that time. And finally I said, "Maybe we ought to go to Hawai'i. We can always come back."

She said, "I'd like nothing better."

And so I canceled the rest of my appointments and went back, and (out we came).

And then when the semester's about over, we all, several of us, had a party, you know, sort of farewell party, and I'll never forget it. We were in the kitchen having a drink, the girls were in the other room, and somebody said, "You know Quinn, you really ought to be in politics."

And I said, "Oh, I don't know, I've never done anything politically, and I wouldn't know. I've never voted." And I said, "I wouldn't know what I'd be. I'd either be a Republican and push or a Democrat and drag my feet."

(Laughter)

WQ: And that's the way I was when I came out here. And before I'd even been admitted—then they used to have what a young associate of mine subsequently had declared unconstitutional. But they used to say that you had to be (in Hawai'i) a year before you could be a lawyer. And so I was not admitted to the bar, but I was about to be, maybe in another two months.

There was a major case over here involving Willie Crozier and Sharon Crozier and it [involved] one of the Belt Roads, Hāna Belt Road, I think. And there was a major lawsuit out of it with the bonding company, and the bank and insurance company, and the contractors and everybody else. And I was there representing another guy that was in politics, John Gomes Duarte [territorial senate, 1948-59; state house 1962-64], you may remember.

DT: Yeah.

WQ: And he was the indemnitor on the bond, so if there's going to be any liability on the contractor—and Willie and Shar were broke—he [Duarte] was going to get stuck. And it so happened that his wife had all the money, and they had gotten his signature. His wife was away, they issued the bond, then got her signature later. So early on, I got her dismissed from the case. And so everybody was grateful in that. O. P. [Oliver P.] Soares was one of the attorneys.

DT: White suit and all.

WQ: White suit and all. And O. P. was the chairman of the Republican party [1948-50, and served in the territorial house 1924-30]. And this was right after [Thomas E.] Dewey had lost to [Harry S.] Truman [for president of the United States in 1948]. I'm up there making these impassioned arguments for my client. The Republican party, as you can imagine, was really in the doldrums with Dewey's defeat. They thought he was going to be elected. And so they were going to have a Lincoln Day dinner or Lincoln Day gathering, and it wasn't a big thing at all. It was going to be at the Republican headquarters that Mary Noonan had on the second floor over there in Kewalo.

DT: Mm hmm. I remember that well.

WQ: And O. P. says, "Will you be our chief speaker?"

I said, "Well, sure, okay." I was so naive about that. This trial lasted about seven weeks, [I'd] come back over the weekend, I went over to the library and got a few books on [Abraham] Lincoln (chuckles) because it's a Lincoln Day talk, I'm going to talk about Lincoln, (chuckles) which I did. And so suddenly I was a Republican.

DT: So you got recruited as a Republican just to make the Lincoln Day speech for them . . .

WQ: Just to make the speech. So, with that, I became a Republican. (Laughs)

DT: So you arrived in Hawai'i in '47.

WQ: That's right.

DT: And about '48, you'd become a Republican because of the speech.

WQ: Because of the speech. And then we were living out at Portlock Road in a wonderful isolated community out there. Everybody had young children. It was one of the most unique and wonderful places, really, to live in those days.

CC: What was your reaction to Hawai'i as a—first time out here and just contrast to your other experiences and other . . .

WQ: Let me say that I'd been here twice before while I was in the navy, but I'd been here for a total of thirty-six hours. And the first time I'd gotten down to see Hotel Street, and the second time I stayed out at Pearl Harbor waiting for transportation onto the—coming back from Okinawa. And so I hadn't seen anything then. What I had seen, I hadn't liked very much.

When I came [in 1947], I was very fortunate in two or three respects. One, there were some really great people in that firm [Robertson, Castle & Anthony], then the firm was one of the largest, but it was still quite small, about six people. Apart from Garner Anthony, there was Alfred Castle, one of the great gentlemen of my experiences. And the other was Tommy [Thomas M.] Waddoups. And Tommy was a very unique guy. Tommy was leaving a couple days after I arrived, and some Hawaiian people, Josephine and Analu Ikuwa, who lived out in Kuli'ou'ou, were going to stay in his house and we could stay in their house while we were looking for our own. So we had that nice situation. We had Al Castle who just warmly greeted us, you know, and (took) care of us. And so what we saw, we liked. And we were able to find a home quite soon on Portlock Road, it was a home that had been moved in there, former army thing, and we were able to afford it. I wrote my dad to see if I could get a loan from him, and not a chance (chuckles), you know. But Alfred Castle and the firm made an advance. They loaned me the money. And so those things were all good.

And meantime, I (made) many friends quickly. For instance, we didn't have a phone for quite a while and we didn't have a car for nine months. And so I used to start out early in the morning, heading down toward the bus stop. But, you know, I wouldn't go like this [hitching a ride], but somebody would always come along, you know, and I got to meet all the people up and down Portlock by getting rides with them downtown. And then I had a few good friends, including Bob [Robert L.] Forbes, who was in our firm and lived out there, to get back home with. And that, I think, was part of what happened to increase my participation in the Republican party because a good friend of mine from out of Portlock Road was treasurer

of the Republican precinct club. And in those days, it stretched from Kāhala through Waimānalo. And it [precinct club] used to meet at the old Hind-Clarke Dairy. And . . .

CC: Which is in lower 'Āina Haina, right?

WQ: That's right. And the Ranch House [restaurant] was there at that time.

DT: And it's still there. [The Ranch House, located on the corner of Kalanianaʻole Highway and West Hind Drive, was demolished in the 1980s.]

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: Okay, at that point we changed tapes, and we're now on tape number two, continuation of interview with Governor Quinn.

DT: In essence, the Republicans simply got to you before the Democrats could then, in a sense.

WQ: Well, I think that's about right. I remember my old friend Bob [Robert G.] Dodge whom you remember, I'm sure, who was a strong Republican. He used to pass the word around that I had been a Democrat before. But I don't know where he got that idea.

DT: You mean he was a strong Democrat. You said Republican. I think you mis-spoke.

WQ: That's right, very strong Democrat. Now my friends out of Portlock came to me once and said, "Will you take the position of president of our precinct club?" I think this must have been in about 1950, or thereabouts.

And I said, "Sure, okay, if you want me."

And so we went to the precinct meeting where the nominating committee was going to put up this slate of officers, and Libby [Elizabeth] Kellerman was there. And Libby got up and said, "This sounds like a railroad to me. What's this idea of having only one candidate for president?" And so she moved to an adjournment [to] give us time to get somebody else, and they got Peter Dillingham. He lived around Niu [Valley] or thereabouts, and then we had a very spirited election. Libby was absolutely right. We had a spirited election, signed up a lot of new members in the precinct club, and we began to make news in the front page of the papers sometime. And we had a motorcade that went from Portlock down and cruised around 'Āina Haina, you know, "Quinn for president of precinct." They reciprocated (by) coming out on Portlock with demonstrations. And I was elected, and we had a precinct club, where we met once a month and where we had maybe a hundred people in attendance. And we had real good speakers and programs. And very early on, one of those speakers was Delegate [Joseph R.] Farrington. And so I went through the business of the meeting and then was going to introduce the speaker. And I remember I just put down [a] single word on my little agenda, "inspiration." So I gave, you know, a rousing talk as I introduced him. So he spoke. And the next day, he or somebody representing him said, "Would you join Delegate Farrington's group as a speaker?"

I said, "Yeah, okay." So I started stumping for Delegate Farrington a little bit.

The next thing I knew I was asked by Mayor [Neal S.] Blaisdell, would I join him and campaign for him?

DT: This would have been the '52 campaign [for mayor of Honolulu], I guess?

WQ: Yes. First one, and I'll tell you a little bit about that because you know who his opponent was. His opponent was Frank [F.] Fasi. But it had been the old fellow [John H.] Wilson [who] had been mayor.

DT: Johnny Wilson had been mayor, but . . .

WQ: Had been mayor, and Frank Fasi ran against Johnny Wilson.

DT: In '52?

WQ: In '52.

DT: Right.

WQ: In the [Democratic] primary, and all the Republicans went over and figured that they could beat Fasi and they couldn't beat Wilson. So they all voted for Fasi, and Fasi beat Wilson in the primary.

DT: Well there was a repeat of that. I think we were in '54, now, because in '52, Fasi and Wilson went up against one another, but Fasi didn't really run very well. He got a substantial vote, but the real crossover vote came in '54. [Blaisdell defeated Fasi for mayor in 1954.]

WQ: Okay. Well, I started speaking for Blaisdell in '52.

DT: Fifty-two. Yeah. He was in there also.

WQ: Then [again in] '54 because he was running against Fasi. And we had just a week or so to go in the campaign and I got a call from [Aura] Nelson Prather [public relations head of Hawai'i Employers Council], whom you probably remember, who was very active with Neal Blaisdell. And he said, "We have fifteen minutes of television and we need somebody to use it."

I said, "Fifteen minutes? That's terrible, what can one do to use it?"

He said, "We can't let it go. It's been given to us and we want to use it for Neal."

I said, "Let me see what I can do with it." At that time, you know television was pretty new.

DT: It came out in '53, as I recall.

WQ: That's right.

DT: The later part of '53.

WQ: So it was very new.

DT: So this was the '54 campaign.

WQ: Yeah. And so I thought about, what was his name—Bishop [Fulton J.] Sheen. And how he would use the library and he'd go from the bookcase to this and (that), moving around as he spoke. [Bishop Sheen had a television series in the 1950s entitled "Life is Worth Living."] I said, "All right, I'll try it." So I got a book and I hollowed out a piece of it and put some notes in the book. And then I said, "Give me a desk and put some books in there," and I borrowed a theme from *Aesop's Fables*. I can't even tell you now what the nature of the two animals were, [but] one was Fasi and the other was Neal. It was a slow and steady wins the race type of thing, you know. (Chuckles) And I sat on the side of the desk, and I read it, and looked at my book occasionally and I'd walk over and pull another book, and I got through fifteen minutes somehow or other on that.

Then Neal asked me if I would serve on the first [city] charter commission. And I did. That was a long one headed by [J.] Ballard Atherton.

DT: Right, that was . . .

WQ: Starting in 1955 . . .

DT: About '57.

WQ: No, before that.

DT: Fifty-five, was it? Okay.

WQ: Fifty-five, I think. Because it went on for about a year and a half or more.

DT: Now '57 I guess, is when it actually passed . . .

WQ: That's correct.

DT: Went into effect, right?

WQ: And Bob Dodge was [vice] chairman of that. And I was on that. And then, why, before that had even made its report in '56, in September, I was approached by Jimmy [James W.] Glover. And he called early in the morning. A matter of fact, I was in [the] supreme court on a case involving land owned by Frank Fasi out there at Dillingham Boulevard.

And so Jimmy said, "Can we see you?"

I said, "Jimmy, I'm sorry, I'm very busy." And it had to do something with politics, I knew, because Jimmy had been a prior [territorial representative 1943-48] and was very active.

He said, "When can we see you?"

I said, "Well, give me a call at noon. I'll be playing volleyball up at the Pacific Club." So he

called at noon, and I said, "Well, I had to go back to supreme court, but, don't come to my office. Where can I meet you? I'll meet you about 3:30."

So they said, "Come to E. E. [Everett Earl] Black's office," down there in Kaka'ako.

So I went there, and there was like a big handful of leading Republicans, including Ben [Benjamin F. Dillingham II]. "Ben Dillingham's father [Walter F. Dillingham] told him he shouldn't run again. And we want you to take his spot." This was the last day for filing for the primary. [They] said, "We don't want to go in with a vacant spot."

And I said, "Well, no, I can't do it. I've got too many children and too much to do."

So, right away [E. E.] "Johnny" Black called up Nancy [Quinn]. And says, "He says he shouldn't run for office."

And Nancy says to him, "Well, he's always said that good people ought to be running for office and I think he ought to."

So then I said, "Well, you know, all of a sudden I'm getting very busy in the practice of law, and we've still only got seven lawyers or eight."

And E. E. Black used to be a client of the firm. And by this time it's getting to be about five o'clock, so he says, "Let's go up to see Garner [Anthony]."

So we drove up to Pacific Heights, and I was expecting Garner—he always called himself a Wilsonian Democrat—I expected him to say, "No, you can't do that." But Garner had no idea what it was to try to run, particularly [as I had] only been here eight or nine years. Eight years. And so, he says, "Sure."

So, I still was saying no, and Jimmy Glover says, "Well, let's go eat some dinner." And we went to the Broiler in Ala Moana; he used to like big steaks and good brandy. So he starts plying me with a little brandy. His wife was with him, Bobby Cox [Barbara Cox Kennedy]. So I guess about 10:30, they persuaded me. I weakened. And right away they called, and in came the petition that had all been signed and everything. So I went in thinking I was the third of three. I wake up the next morning and Peppy [George P.] Cooke, [Jr.] has also (chuckles) declared his candidacy, so I'm in a contested [senate] primary [along with Quinn, Mary Robinson, and Joseph Itagaki].

Now, two things happened. One, I started to really campaign, and I wasn't seeing much of my law office. I don't think Garner ever expected that. Second thing that happened was my first major campaign, a rally. In those days, we had the big rallies.

DT: Big rallies, right.

WQ: Lots of people. And the first was at Farrington High School, and the Republican senatorial candidates were way up at the top of the list of the program. I don't know, it seemed to me in those days, including the people parked in their cars with their lights on, and that sort of thing, there may have been as many as 4[00] or 500 people there. And they start to introduce the Republican candidates. And first is Mary K. (Hart) Robinson who was an incumbent

senator. "You all know Girlie Hart, and she's from the same great Hart family, married to Mark Robinson," you know. Second, Joe [Joseph] Itagaki of the 442nd [Regimental Combat Team], incumbent senator. And it goes on and on like that. Third, George "Peppy" Cooke, whose father [George P. Cooke] was president of the senate [in the 1930s]. And at that time, Peppy had a musician with him who started playing the "Moloka'i March," and so forth. And then Peppy got up and made his talk. And then, they introduced me. Started just like this. "Born in Rochester, New York. . . ." And I just nearly died. I sank down in my chair, you know, and that's the way it started.

But a couple of things happened. One was that I got a group of young Japanese veterans who were for Mike Miyake [the Republican candidate for city and county auditor in 1956]. And they thought if they tied in with us, that Mike might do better in some of the more *Haole* precincts. [Miyake lost in the general election to Democrat James Murakami] And. . . . Go ahead, do you have a question?

DT: I was just going to interrupt and, remind everyone that this is now 1956, and the Republican fortunes had changed dramatically from, let's say, the way they were in 1952.

WQ: Oh, had they ever.

DT: Because of '54. So you were coming in . . .

WQ: At a time . . .

DT: . . . not necessarily as a part of the big majority party, but you were coming in really to help . . .

WQ: To regain . . .

DT: . . . try to oppose and regain . . .

WQ: . . . some positions.

DT: . . . former positions.

WQ: That is absolutely right. And these others were incumbents that had carried over from that great defeat of 1954, but they were in a minority.

DT: And not many had carried over.

WQ: That's correct.

DT: So things were looking pretty grim for the Republican party. In other words, the Republican party, for the first time in years, was really looking for new faces, weren't they?

WQ: That is absolutely right.

DT: And so you fit the bill, shall we say.

WQ: I fit that bill, but on the other hand, this was an island-wide race—[Fourth district] senatorial race. And I'd only lived here, you know, a few years. And, you know, there's perhaps more consciousness of *malihinis* then than now. And this was a terrible hurdle to overcome. But what happened was, that these young Japanese ancestry veterans, mostly nisei, three of them, joined my campaign. And suddenly, we started to hit it off, I mean the four of us. When we started campaigning, we'd go in some areas, and I'd walk down the middle of the street and they'd be knocking on doors on both sides. I'd run back and forth, you know, and we got along well. The one thing that happened out of that was that the Sunday paper, and the guy—you know him, a reporter at any rate. He used to be with the paper, and then he did something else at the University [of Hawai'i] . . .

DT: Millard Purdy?

WQ: No, no. I can picture him very well, and I can't pull his name out right now.

DT: Which newspaper was it?

WQ: I think it was the [*Honolulu Advertiser*]. And he was sandy-haired, had glasses, and not too large. And he was with them for several years. Any rate, he'd call one time and he said, "Can we go with you on Sunday? Around, on one day of campaigning?"

I said, "Sure." So they went with me. We're going through public housing areas, they're taking picture after picture after picture. And they gave me a full page about the new Republican out campaigning among the people. Because, you know, the people [Republicans], for fifty years, hadn't done that.

DT: Right.

WQ: I lost, but I ran way ahead of all the others. I won the primary.

DT: Won the primary.

WQ: And Peppy was out. And then in the general, I ran way ahead of Girlie Hart and Joe Itagaki. And I almost beat Herman Lee. I mean, Herbert Lee, . . .

DT: [Democrat] Herbert [K. H.] Lee.

WQ: . . . who was the president of the senate [1958-59]. I came just that close. And there's just no question in my mind that that was the single factor which probably played the greatest part in my being appointed governor the next year.

DT: That led to a greater role for you, that is for certain. I know this was the talk of the town. I happened to be away at the time of that particular fall election. And when I returned [there] was much talk about this tremendous race with this new Republican. And Democrats were feeling a little bit worried about here was some new face that might do them some harm in the future.

WQ: But then what aided me even more at that time was. . . . I had intended to go back then and continue my work with the charter commission. And as a matter of fact, Ballard [Atherton]

got a little angry with me, but the governor, Governor [Samuel Wilder] King, asked me if I would serve on the statehood commission. And I agreed to do that, and of course, I couldn't go back to the charter commission. So, starting at the very beginning of the year, [I] started working with the statehood commission. We did go back to Washington, testified before couple of congressional committees, and I was one of the chief spokesmen.

And then we came back and the legislature was still in session. I got a call from the governor or his office, and the message was they weren't going to send my name down as member of the statehood commission. The reason they weren't was because since I had run against these Democrats, they were all going to vote against me. And so I said, "Well, send it down anyhow and let them do that, Governor."

"No, I'm not going to do it." And so he appointed somebody else. I think it may have been O. P. [Soares].

DT: Yeah, yeah.

WQ: So then, subsequently, [Gov. King] said, "Can I make you chairman of the library commission?" (Chuckles)

I said, "Sure." So I did that for a little while.

And in July of that year, I got a telephone call. And the fellow says, "This is Tony Lausy from the [U.S.] Interior Department. Is this Bill Quinn?"

I said, "Yes."

He said, "Bill Quinn who was member of the statehood commission?"

I said, "Well, I was. I'm not anymore." Then I said, "I remember you, Tony." He was head of the Office of Territories in the Department of Interior, but very, very close to the Secretary [of the Interior, Frederick Seaton].

He says, "The Secretary wants to know if you can come back to Washington, and he wants to talk to you."

And I said, "What about?"

"Well," he said, "I can't really tell you, but it's gotta be something about number one, and number two out there." Well, what was happening and had been for five or six months, was that Sam King had not been reappointed when Eisenhower's second term started. And he was holding over, and there were four or five Republicans like Harold Kay and Art [Arthur] Woolaway and others that were seeking the governorship, to be appointed.

DT: This was our second time around [1956], if I may intervene, because they'd had another go around in '52 for the governorship.

WQ: That's correct.

DT: And, how much did you know about this back in '52, you were . . .

WQ: I didn't know much about it, but I certainly learned about it since, and I suffered my share of the ultimate consequences because Randy [Randolph] Crossley expected to be appointed by Eisenhower. And he'd been head of the Eisenhower campaign out here. And, I think, everybody expected him to be appointed governor, and he certainly expected it. And Bob [Sen. Robert A.] Taft and Eisenhower had had a big convention problem, as you know, and Eisenhower had won [the Republican nomination for president in 1952, over Sen. Robert Taft]. And the story I have heard is that Taft went to Eisenhower, and he says, "If you expect my cooperation in the [U.S.] Senate," and he was certainly a strong leader in the [U.S.] Senate, he said, "there's some things I want, and one of them is I want my old friend Sam [Wilder] King to be appointed governor."

DT: Now, that's the way I understand it, too. We'll take a break here for a moment now.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is tape number three, continuation of interview with Governor William Quinn.

DT: As I recall, Randy Crossley was really quite devastated by not getting that appointment.

WQ: Indeed he was. And so therefore, when '56 came around [i.e., Eisenhower was re-elected president], and Bob Taft was no longer on the scene, Randy very much expected that he would be the appointee. And when I was appointed [governor of Hawai'i] in mid-'57, I don't think Randy ever forgave me, and he caused me countless hours of agony in his role as a Republican [territorial and state] senator.

DT: That leads me to interject a question here about the factionalism really from the time that you entered the party until up to your appointment as governor when the plot thickens, shall we say. As I recall, there was really what was called the King faction of the Republican party, there was a [Joseph] Farrington faction, there was a [Royal A.] Vitousek faction, there was a Crossley faction, and one might even point to a Hiram Fong faction, I suppose. How did you—were you untouched by all of this or . . .

WQ: Yes.

DT: . . . did you just maintain good relations with all of them until [you] actually got into the gubernatorial picture?

WQ: When I ran for territorial senate in 1956, I don't think I had ever met Sam King [Samuel Wilder King]. And [Royal S. "Roy"] Vitousek was no longer on the scene and had not been for a few years. Sam, Jr. [Samuel P. King] and I were good friends. We'd been in a book club for a number of years. Mary Noonan was the successor to Vitousek, but she was also the party chairman, I think, or at least executive secretary of the Republican party.

DT: Executive secretary, I believe. Because Randy Crossley had been chairman throughout much of those early years.

WQ: Randy was chairman in I think '52, '51, thereabouts for a while. That's right. Hiram [Fong]

was always an individual. Hiram had his own group. And in 1956, running, you know, you don't go to Hiram and say, "How about joining forces in this, that, or the other area." He had his own team, and they played very well. Although we were good friends, I'd known him, and a matter of fact—I don't want to get out ahead of myself.

But the factions never really entered my mind. For instance, I did campaign for [Elizabeth] Farrington. It didn't disturb any relationships I had with Neal [Blaisdell]. As I say, I didn't know Sam, the governor, at that time, although I knew his children. And I had been active. I went, at one time, in that early period, to the central committee, and I had spoken at the [Republican] party conventions in '54 and '55 maybe, something like that, at the request of Art Woolaway. I think Art was chairman at one point, right about then.

DT: He became chairman after Crossley, I believe, that's right.

WQ: That's right. And it didn't really hit me that the party was factionated at that time, Dan. And it may have been, but the factions that I knew most came after I was governor.

DT: All this had to do with probably long-standing animosities here locally which you had been removed from, (because, you) not being here.

WQ: Yes, I hadn't been a part of (it), yes.

DT: But then when you became governor in '57, you began to feel the sting of some of these factions.

WQ: Oh, indeed I did. And the first sting that I felt constantly, was Randy. Because Randy so resented the fact, as I understand it, in 1956. He really, as I said before, expected [to be appointed governor]. He felt it was owed him because he'd been denied it in '52. And when he didn't get it, he became a very bitter person.

DT: Which was tough for you because you have really fallen into sort of a pattern, at least your philosophy seemed to be that of a liberal Republican. And here was Randy Crossley who'd been a liberal Republican . . .

WQ: That's right.

DT: . . . Hawai'i style, tied in with Dwight Eisenhower, and then you walk off with the prize. Why, this was sort of the last straw, wasn't it?

WQ: Yeah. Now, one thing that did occur, as I had mentioned earlier. There was quite a bit of resentment in some quarters about my appointment. I mean people like Harold Kay, who thought that he ought to get it, and Sam [Wilder] King's followers, who thought he ought to be reappointed, were very much opposed to what had happened. And I think I anticipated some of that, 'cause when I went back at that meeting when Tony Lausy called, I said, "I'll think it over, call me Monday."

And when he called on Monday, I had given it some thought, and I said, "Well, I might as well go back [to Washington, D.C.]." Obviously, I'm a new Republican on the scene and I had a pretty good election race, and maybe he just wants to get some independent thinking on

what should be done. I did get some inkling from some friends of mine who were privately betting that something might happen, but I didn't believe it. And I had no knowledge, no evidence of any kind, you know, that I was going to be treated for anything.

So I got back there, spent the night, and I got a message, "Meet at the office of Tony Lausy at eleven o'clock in the morning," and then we'd have lunch with the Secretary at twelve.

So I go in to see Tony Lausy and I said, "Tony, what's this all about?"

"Well," he said, "The Secretary's going to be out in Hawai'i in two or three weeks. And he wants to get this whole thing settled at that time." And he said, "I think what he's probably going to do, is ask you if you would take the number two job as secretary of Hawai'i, and then maybe, he'd suggest to Sam [Wilder] King that he'd hold it for another couple years and then step aside, and maybe you could then come up to that job."

About that time, we go into lunch. Then they had all the assistant secretaries and the undersecretary and everybody there, staff people, it must have been about twenty-five. And it's obvious that somebody'd passed around some homework on me because they're asking some very acute questions, you know. For instance, if you remember Sam [Wilder] King vetoed a tax bill, and that was widely talked about, they asked me what did I think about that?

CC: Yeah, and about thirty-five or forty bills. (Chuckles)

WQ: That's right.

CC: Vetoed.

WQ: That's right. And they asked me a number of other questions about my background and so forth. And finally, the Secretary said, "Well, come on in and have a cup of coffee with me."

So I went in the other room, in his private office, and we're having a cup of coffee, and he starts to talk. And it's obvious, he's working up to a job. And I interrupted him. And I said, "Mr. Secretary, I want you to know that I didn't come to Washington for a job, and I don't want one."

He looked at me a minute, and he said, "Well, you can say, 'No,' to me, but I challenge you to say, 'No,' to the man in the White House," pointing.

And I said, "Well, I have to tell you, Mr. Secretary, that I'm not interested in being secretary of Hawai'i," which is what I had heard from Tony Lausy.

And he looked at me for a minute, and he says, "What about governor?"

And it just hit me like a ton of bricks. And I said, "Well, I couldn't say no."

He said, "When are you leaving?"

I said, "Tonight."

He said, "Change your plans. Have dinner with me." And he said, "When we have dinner, think about who you think ought to be secretary of Hawai'i with you." And then he asked me a question (chuckles), he said, "Is there anything in your background that would militate against this appointment?"

And I said, "No."

And he said, "Well, you better be right because I'm going to recommend the appointment before we have an FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] field investigation. And if they turn [up] anything on you, you're dead."

DT: The question still lingers to this day.

(Laughter)

WQ: It sure does. It certainly does. You know, right away I'm thinking about times I've kicked up my heels, you know, here, there, (chuckles) and some things that, you know. So any rate, I thought that afternoon, and I started thinking about what we were talking about a minute ago. This is going to be such a shock to the people of Hawai'i. To have a young *malihini* like me, named governor. And it's against everything that I've ever preached, that we ought to have a right to name our own, and then it ought to be one of us, you know. And so I said, "Well, how can I best ameliorate this?"

Well, I'd been thinking of people of my own age, and people I'd worked with, and people I knew that I could work well together. And I decided that Farrant Turner, who was then secretary of Hawai'i, and who was old enough to be my father, would be a good way to get some continuity there and ease the pain of this announcement. And so at dinner, I suggested that, and they readily acquiesced.

I went to see the president the next morning. I was spirited in, so we did [not] see any press, in or out. And the secretary said, "Well," he said, "you are not to say anything to anybody about this, until the announcement comes from the White House." All right.

So I rearranged my plans, and flying back, I flew through Saint Louis and saw my mother. Called her and told her I was coming. Naturally, she had a few friends of mine (there). And naturally, I said something about it to these people, close that they (were) to me. Hopped on a plane, went to San Francisco. Arrived at eight or nine o'clock at night. It was dark. We taxied to a stop, and then they used to have the gangway going down, you know, and at the foot of the gangway, I could see a crowd of people and some cameras and so forth. I [thought] "Oh, that talkative mother of mine." And so I got off, and I walked down. I didn't look left or right. I just walked right through this group and kept walking, you know. And somebody said, "How do you feel, Governor?"

(Chuckles)

It was a fellow, Jerry somebody, who had been with the papers here and then was with the [*San Francisco Examiner*—the [*San Francisco Chronicle*, rather, I think.

And he came over, he said, "This announcement came from the White House." (Chuckles)

So, I breathed a big sigh of relief.

CC: It wasn't Mom, right?

WQ: Yeah, it wasn't Mom.

CC: One thing, when you were in Washington, having that discussion and [from] what you say, obviously, [it] was somewhat of a surprise that it had gone that far. Did they discuss any of the reasoning in going to somebody like yourself that—was it to avoid all the other factions or was it a way out for them, or did you ever . . .

WQ: No. There was no discussion of that, whatsoever, with me at that time. Subsequently, I heard that they just wanted to make a change, and I think President [Eisenhower] really had been forced the first time [to appoint Samuel Wilder King] and didn't want to continue his initial appointment.

DT: Who pushed you in Hawai'i? Do you know who would . . .

WQ: Nobody.

DT: Nobody had pushed you in Hawai'i?

WQ: No. There hadn't been any talk of it at all.

DT: And you figure this simply stemmed from [the] impression you made upon them at the earlier statehood meeting you had in Washington.

WQ: Well, that, and I guess, the political record of that last election.

DT: Oh yes, mm hmm.

WQ: But the other thing was, when I left Secretary Seaton's office, I had bumped into Tony Lausy. As I say, he was very close to the secretary, and he said, "What happened?"

"Well," I said, "he asked me to be governor." And Tony blanched, his jaw dropped, and he was totally surprised. And I really think that Secretary Seaton did it on the spur of the moment. I really think so 'cause I don't think he had consulted anybody.

DT: There's no evidence that somebody like [Elizabeth] Farrington had been pushing you or . . .

WQ: No, no, no.

DT: . . . that the [*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*] representative in Washington had . . .

WQ: None at all, no. Not a bit. They were astonished.

DT: . . . said anything about you?

WQ: Yeah. They were astonished.

DT: Or see, who were the national committeemen at the time? Any of them . . .

WQ: Well, the national committeemen, one of them was, I think, Art [Woolaway], and he wanted the job. And I had joined a full-page ad, urging the reappointment of Sam [Wilder] King.

DT: So this is really a Washington reaction to what was sort of a mixed up factional dispute in Hawai'i. And that was, we want to stay away from all of this and we'll appoint a new face.

WQ: There was some inquiry made, not through any party circles, or anything like that. But on that weekend, before I called them back and said that I would come but only overnight or something, there was a fellow [who] used to live here by the name of Bill [William N.] Jardine. Bill was very active in one of those orange juice businesses and, subsequently, also established it in Japan. His widow still lives here.

DT: Oh, really, mm hmm.

WQ: And his father [William M. Jardine] had been a very eminent and active Republican back in Kansas. And Fred Seaton came from Kansas. And I learned—Bill Jardine asked me to come see him. And he said, "I've had a call from my friend Fred Seaton, asking about you." So there was some inquiries of that type, but nothing official.

DT: You have no evidence that the FBI had been running any checks or anything of that sort?

WQ: None at all.

DT: Mm hmm.

WQ: None at all.

CC: Very interesting.

WQ: Yeah. So then, when I was appointed, (chuckles) I guess, a major program was statehood. And so we geared up and went back to Washington, early in 1958. And at that time, for some strange reason, it was strange to us at the time, Alaska—which had always been way back in the rear because it didn't have the economic self-sufficiency and was such a huge territory and so forth—began to come along as a potential state. And pretty soon, they're talking about Hawai'i and Alaska. And in 1958, they started talking about Alaska first. And so Jack [John A.] Burns, the delegate [to Congress], was very much in favor of that strategy. And clearly, it was the strategy of Sam Rayburn [Speaker of the U.S. House] and Lyndon Johnson [U.S. Senate majority leader]. And so there was very little we could do when we were back there. In fact, we went back at one point, Seaton asked us to come back and see if we could really get this battle for statehood going in true partisan fashion. He said, "See if you can't make it a little more Republican in appearance in that statehood commission of yours," headed by the publisher then, of the [*Honolulu Advertiser*, Thurston . . .

DT: Lorrin [P.] Thurston.

WQ: Lorrin Thurston. And so I said, "Now, how can I do this and still give it a good solid and effective appearance and effectiveness?" And I decided what I would do would be, get those

people who had last served in Washington. And that would be Betty [Elizabeth] Farrington and Sam [Wilder] King, who had [both] been delegates to Congress at one time—and that's where he and Bob Taft had become friends—and so I arranged to have the three of us go back to Washington on statehood. That was entirely a Republican face, as you can understand, but followed in just a few days by the whole statehood commission. And then when we were all back there, we just traded equally on who would call on whom and how to do this.

CC: So you had set your Republican strategy for how to obtain statehood if you possibly could then?

WQ: Yeah.

CC: We'll take a break and pick it up from there.

WQ: All right.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is tape number four with William Quinn.

CC: So the Republican strategy was pretty well set, but in the meantime, Jack Burns had been elected delegate to Congress, I believe. He was a Democrat and had been elected in '56, and now again came back in '58. I think we're still in the period, sort of the early part of your governorship, when you were talking about statehood.

WQ: That's correct.

CC: And you said Burns was backing the strategy of Alaska first. Now, it's alleged in many quarters that Burns really developed this strategy himself. Is that the way you visualized it, or did you visualize it coming from other sources?

WQ: I don't visualize it that way, nor did I see—and Jack could not articulate any benefit to Hawai'i by Alaska first, since Hawai'i had been out there for thirty years trying to get it. I really think that there was a feeling in the highest circles of the Senate, particularly, that if Alaska became a state, they would have two Democratic senators. And they actually had elected and sent two people back there on the cause of statehood as senators-elect or something like that. [Ernest Gruening and William Egan]. Any rate, the names escape me at the moment.

DT: You mean, Alaska's future senators?

WQ: They sent people, these were . . .

DT: Delegate to Congress, [Edward L.] Bartlett . . .

WQ: Bartlett.

DT: Bartlett was one.

WQ: One other.

DT: This was a result of the Tennessee Plan being put into operation. Is that what you're referring to?

WQ: Ah, no. I'm referring to they sent these people back as their version of a statehood commission.

DT: Yeah, well, their version of the statehood commission was a result of this Tennessee Plan.

WQ: Tennessee, that's right.

DT: They were sending people down as elected senators in order to lobby.

WQ: That's correct. That is exactly what they did, and that was the Tennessee Plan, now that you . . .

CC: This is a result of George Lehleitner's falling in love with Hawai'i, but he decided that Hawai'i wasn't doing enough, and so he went after Alaska first.

WQ: Okay. And George had some influence in that, obviously. But at any rate, the word that I was getting—talking to people around and lobbying for statehood in the spring of 1958—was that one, our delegate [Burns] wasn't pushing it. But two, there were many people that thought that if Republicans came—[Hawai'i] might well have Republican senators. And the other thing was, if you remember how strong the civil rights controversies were in those days, and they felt that anybody that comes from Hawai'i, Republican or Democrat, would certainly support the civil rights bills in the Senate—or I mean, the Congress. And so, for whatever reasons, and that, you know, it's still murky after all these years.

To divert a little bit. Do you remember the little fellow who was the [executive] secretary of the [Hawai'i] statehood commission [Jan Jabulka]? And his name is well known and, again, it's another name that realized that I hadn't thought about for so long. But I'll tell you this, that he died several years ago. And on his deathbed, he sent over a letter to me, which was a letter from Jack Burns, the original ten-page letter from Jack Burns to Oren Long, member of the statehood commission, later to be a senator. And [Burns' letter was] explaining, answering four letters. He said "I'm sorry I haven't answered before." But he goes on to explain, he says that he really thought that we ought to just have an elected governor and not have statehood because we [had] not yet earned it, and that many of the people—this was 1958—and that many of the people who had urged it publicly, had opposed it privately, and until these business people and others came out and cured that deficiency and were really honest, he thought that an elected governor would be enough. He also went on in the very same letter, and I have the letter, to say that, "So," he said, "I do not go out," but he was still campaigning for statehood, in a way. But he explained this to Oren Long, what he thought ought to be the better way. And then, he went on to say that, "So I'm not really urging anybody, but when people come up and ask me questions, then I can explain to them what we are and why we are deserving," and that this, in his opinion, is a better way.

DT: Some have doubted that Burns was really in favor of statehood. This would tend to lend credence to this hypothesis.

WQ: It certainly does. If you could see the letter, you'd know that for sure.

DT: You better make sure the letter is preserved in some way.

WQ: I've got—yes.

DT: You [are] going to make sure that it will be around for some time.

WQ: Yes, I have it. It's going to be part of a book, I guess, at some time.

DT: Ah. Good, that's good.

WQ: But at any rate, I do have it. But it was funny that this man [Jabulka] had it all these years, and it's on his deathbed that he sent it over. He said, "I think you ought to have it."

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

CC: When you took the Republican group to lobby for statehood, was it still your intention at that time to push Hawai'i as the forty-ninth state, or was it . . .

WQ: At that time, we were forced to and did agree, let Alaska go first. That's fine. But we were back there and Alaska [statehood] passed in April [1958], and the president signed it. And one of their fears were that if you tried to push Hawai'i too fast, that they thought President Eisenhower would veto Alaska and sign Hawai'i. So they waited. But then when that had actually been complete, we went back there with this group, and as I recall, there was about seven or eight weeks left, minimum, in the senatorial session. So we went back, and I talked to some of the leaders. The leaders of the House [of Representatives] said, "We're behind you 100 percent." (But) the Senate, "Well, it doesn't look like it's going to be called up."

So, I had to see Lyndon Johnson. I called a dear friend of mine, whom I'd known in the navy for a while, Jim [James H.] Rowe, Jr., and Jim Rowe [counsel to the Senate Majority Policy Committee] was a very influential Democrat in Washington. Before the war, he had been one of those [Franklin D.] Roosevelt young men that lived at the White House, and so forth. And he was a great friend of Lyndon Johnson. When Lyndon Johnson came in the navy for a while and then left it again, he gave Jim his big, heavy coat, his bridge coat. And I remember we remarked about it, and I found out that it was Lyndon Johnson's because it had two-and-a-half stripes on it, and Jim was a two-striper. (So) it was Lyndon Johnson's. So I called Jim in Washington while we were there. I said, "Do you think you can get me in to see the [Senate majority leader]?"

He said, "Of course." And he called me back, and he said, "Six-thirty tonight."

So I went over there, I had to wait maybe a hour and a half or so. The fellow who was administrative assistant to Lyndon at that time [Bobby Baker], saw me and gave me a cup of coffee and said he'll be late, he's busy on the floor. So the [majority leader] of the Senate

came in about, I guess, eight o'clock, and [I] went in. He greeted me, "Well," he says, "Jim Rowe says you're a pretty nice guy, even if you are a Republican," you know. (Chuckles)

And I said, "Yes." We had a little—just a very tiny amount of small talk and I said, "Well, Senator, I'm here to urge the cause of statehood for Hawai'i." And I said, "Alaska is now passed and gone, and we know, from talking to people all through the House and Senate, that the great majority are in favor of it [Hawai'i statehood]."

He looked at me and he pointed to a desk where there was a red telephone. He said, "Young man, you see that telephone there?" He says, "That's the telephone that I use when I speak to your president. And when your president wants me to do something, he calls me on that phone." And he says, "I'm trying to get the mutual assistance bill in for your president." And he said, "We just don't have time for a lot of these other things, and it's not going to happen."

And I said, "Well, I have to say, Senator, this week, we've counted something close to a thousand editorials in favor of statehood for Hawai'i." And I said, "I have one right here." I had *Life Magazine* with me, and the center editorial was called "*Wela ka hao!* Strike while the iron is hot," urging that you don't tarry. Get statehood for Hawai'i right now. And I didn't tell him this, but I really had a great fear, that if it got into the next session, got tied up with the civil rights bills and so forth, that we might, you know, just fade back for another ten years or so, a very genuine fear. Well, I expressed this, and I showed him the editorial. And we were sitting sort of like this, so he moved closer, and he got up so his face was no further than this from mine.

He said, "Now, let me tell you something young man." The vein sticking out, the face getting redder. He says, "Let me tell you something, young man. Not *Life Magazine*, not anybody else, not the president of the United States, but I run this Senate (pounding noise) and I'm the one that's going to determine when any bill comes up and when it doesn't, and no one else. Do you understand that!" Just like that.

DT: It was Lyndon Johnson then?

WQ: Lyndon Johnson. Well, I sort of backed off, you know, and I got up and I said, "Well, I thank you for your time, Senator." As I got to the door, I turned around and said, "I hope, Senator, that you may be able to make some statement before this session is over, expressing support for statehood for Hawai'i next session." And I went back to the hotel, we all packed up and went home. But, as it happened, that upsurge that I pointed out to him that very week, kept on. And the pressure became greater, and it seemed quite apparent when the next session came in in January of 1957 . . .

DT: Fifty-nine.

WQ: Fifty-nine.

DT: Fifty-nine, yeah.

WQ: When they came in in 1959 that the statehood bill was going to pass in that session. And if you will remember, we formed a group of about a thousand to plan the celebration of

statehood. We had a big meeting at McKinley [High School]. And we had another group to start planning various things, like what will be the official bird, and this and that, and what will we do when statehood comes, you know. And then, things were moving right along, and one day, in April or May, I think it was—no, it was March. I got a call from the chief counsel [to] the Interior Department. And George [W. Abbott] said to me, he said, “Can you get here right away.”

I said, “Why?”

Well he said, “Things are happening on statehood.”

And I said, “Sure, I’ll get there as fast as I can.”

And I hopped on, I think I flew, making connections and so forth. At any rate, I got there at about nine o’clock at night at the Washington airport. I was met by George Abbott. And he says, “Leave your bags, and let’s go.”

And I got into the car, and we drove right to the old senate office building. We went up to the senate building, and the old [U.S.] Supreme Court room is in that building. And here were lights and three or four standing microphones, and wires all around, you know. And no sooner did we get to that room, then we heard a commotion coming down the hall. And what had happened was, that they brought up the bill for statehood for Hawai‘i in the Senate. And people got up, Southerners mainly, to speak against it. And Lyndon [Johnson] went over and said, “Sit down, you can get it all on the record. That little son of a bitch from Hawai‘i is on his way over here, and we want to get this done before he gets here.”

And so when that group came in, it was Senator [Henry M.] Jackson, it was Delores Martin, the Democratic national committeewoman, Jack Burns [delegate to Congress], and three or four other Democratic senators, and they were going to have this great big public display of passage of the bill in the Senate without a single Republican on hand, and that’s why they [the Republican administration] had asked me to come as quick as I could. Well, it worked just the way Seaton might have wanted, and certainly not anything that any of the Democratic group could have expected. Because I’d known Delores for a long time, and she was overjoyed, and I was so happy, and she ran over and we gave each other a great, big hug like this, and all the cameras clicked, and that was the picture that was used all over the country, the Republican governor and the Democratic national committeewoman. And that was the only reason I went back [to Washington, D.C.]. And I didn’t know what it was until I got there. But at any rate, that’s what happened.

I stayed there then because the House vote then was going to come up. And Ed Johnston [secretary of Hawai‘i] was acting governor. And I was on the telephone. I watched the House vote for a little while, then I went down and got on the phone. And I got connected to Ed Johnston on the line. And somebody came down to me as soon as they got the majority vote, and I announced that to Johnston, and he started that statehood celebration with the ringing of the bells, all schools let out, people thronged into the street, and then that evening, they lighted the big bonfire that had all been collected with wood from all over the country, on Sand Island, and so forth.

DT: So the bells were ringing and everything. I think we should clear up a couple of things. One

is, you mention Ed Johnston. Last time we referred to a secretary of Hawai'i, we had Farrant Turner there.

WQ: That's correct.

DT: When did Ed Johnston become your secretary to the territory?

WQ: Farrant decided, and I encouraged it in, I think 1958, to run for delegate to Congress. And he did, and he was defeated by Jack Burns. Ed Johnston had been chairman of the Republican party but had also been a longtime acquaintance of mine and also was a very able fellow, and I figured that his appointment would sit very nicely with the Republicans. And so I recommended that to the president, and the president made that appointment.

DT: So you were able to upstage the (WQ chuckles) Democrats a little bit on the publicity . . .

WQ: Well, at least not be completely upstaged by them.

DT: And, but this was only a defensive mechanism . . .

WQ: That's correct.

DT: . . . and apparently it was not an aggressive mechanism, . . .

WQ: That's right.

DT: . . . on the part of the Republican majority. While we're on it, before we forget it, we should get back and talk about Jack Burns a little bit and his role. I think that person who gave you the letter might have been Jan Jabulka.

WQ: It was Jan Jabulka.

DT: Jabulka.

WQ: Yes.

DT: I thought at first it might have been [Cyrus] Nils Tavares, but it is Jan Jabulka.

WQ: Jan Jabulka.

DT: Now, he was Mr. Big Cigar.

WQ: That's correct.

CC: He always had a big cigar in his mouth.

WQ: That's correct, that's right. And how he got that letter, which was the original letter from Jack Burns to Oren Long, I don't know. But it had been something of a treasure to him, I guess, because it was on his deathbed that he arranged to send it over. In fact it was—he sent a message over that he had something for me, and after he died, it was delivered.

DT: There was another thing going on in the wings, and that was that Lyndon Johnson had presidential aspirations, too, for 1960, just around the corner.

WQ: Very definitely.

DT: And this probably worked to the advantage of Hawai'i, wouldn't you say, in making sure that Hawai'i was posted for action.

WQ: I think probably so.

DT: We'll have to pause again.

WQ: Yeah.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is tape number five, the last tape of this session with Governor Quinn.

DT: There is a big question mark concerning the role played by Jack Burns. In other words, he was pretty much put in a position as a candidate for reelection to delegate to Congress of having to campaign when the news wasn't all that favorable coming out of Washington. So in that sense, I would imagine as a politician yourself, back in those days, you had considerable empathy, at least for the role in which he was cast.

WQ: Yes, I think so. One other thing, at that time, was that this strategy of Alaska first became a Democratic party strategy that was embraced all the way down. Because when I put together, not only the Republican group, but the whole statehood commission to go back and battle for statehood for Hawai'i now that Alaska had passed, such good friends of mine as Bill [William F.] Richardson, then chairman of the [Democratic] party, and what's the fellow's name, speaker of the house now on Maui.

DT: Elmer Cravalho.

WQ: Elmer and others, they were all saying, "The governor's turning this into a political football, the governor's doing this and that," you know, and "Let's let things take its course," and there was really quite a strong battle going on there. And of course, I guess I was equally charging Jack Burns with failing to serve his people and try to make the effort to get statehood, you know, and so forth. But as it worked, it was fine, you know. And our fears proved unfounded as to whether we could get it the next year.

DT: And before you knew it, you were suddenly in an election-type situation in the middle of 1959, but before we come to that . . .

WQ: Yes.

DT: . . . you've made reference to Elmer Cravalho. What do you know about the coalition in the [territorial] house of representatives that occurred earlier in that year here in Hawai'i. The Elmer Cravalho coalition that brought him to power in the house of representatives.

- WQ: I'm not sure that I can cast much light on that, Dan. I'm trying to recollect. I haven't thought about that for so long. Name the principal players, [Tadao] Beppu [assistant majority floor leader] was one.
- DT: Well, Vince [O. Vincent] Esposito, . . .
- WQ: And Vince.
- DT: . . . and Tom Gill. So essentially Elmer Cravalho-Burns movement as over against . . .
- WQ: Vince.
- DT: . . . Vince Esposito, primary character, and Tom Gill. Vince Esposito was sort of cast into oblivion after that.
- WQ: That's correct.
- DT: Tom Gill survived as an aide, really to Elmer Cravalho.
- WQ: Right.
- DT: And some staff people like Dick [Richard H.] Kosaki went along . . .
- WQ: That's right.
- DT: . . . with Cravalho who picked him up, even though they had been sort of officially tied in with the Esposito-Gill group.
- WQ: Yes.
- DT: But the Republican side, of course, I'd be interested in. How did it happen that the Republicans decide to coalesce with the minority of Democrats?
- WQ: Well, they weren't a minority.
- DT: Republicans were a minority.
- WQ: Oh, the Republicans were, you said that . . .
- DT: The Republicans were a minority.
- WQ: A majority of Democrats.
- DT: A majority of Republicans coalesced with a minority of . . .
- WQ: Oh, oh.
- DT: Democrats . . .

WQ: In order to make a . . .

DT: . . . in order to make a majority.

WQ: Yes. I'll have to say that the governor didn't get involved in that, and I really was not any part of that at all.

DT: I see.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: And you really hadn't had any depth, background, on the coalition, that earlier, had brought Hiram Fong to this speakership [1949-53] . . .

WQ: Well, I remember writing . . .

DT: . . . when the Republicans were still in power.

WQ: I remember writing a poem that was published in the (chuckles) *Star-Bulletin*, in the early [19]50s when that happened. The name of the poem was the Battered Bard, I remember. And the theme that ran through was Fukushima, Shimamura and Fong.

DT: I see.

WQ: (Chuckles) Had nice rhythm to it. And I remember that coalition much better, really, than I do . . .

DT: Than you do the other one.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: Well, let's move along here as rapidly as we can. All of a sudden from the joys of statehood, for all of the friction that may have been involved, you were suddenly placed in a position where you had to make up your mind, whether you were or were not interested in becoming the first [elected] state governor of Hawai'i.

WQ: Yes. And there were a lot of people that were suggesting that I run for [U.S.] Senate. Some people who were not necessarily supporters of mine or Republicans but who were suggesting that if I ran for Senate and Jack [Burns] ran for governor, that I would have their full support. And it was an intriguing thought. But I had such small children, and so many of them. And I just felt that I didn't want to try to handle a family situation by moving to Washington. Plus the fact that we had started some really great things in the territorial government, that I wanted to see carried out.

CC: What was that agenda that you thought was . . .

WQ: Well, at the top of the heap, I learned that as soon as I got in there, if I hadn't known it as a citizen, was that O'ahu was very prosperous. The neighbor islands were just dying on their feet for several reasons. One, sugar was mechanizing, contracting in its employment.

Pineapple plantations were being closed. And there was like twelve, thirteen, fourteen percent unemployment and a reducing population on every neighbor island. And so I said, something's got to be done about this.

And so starting—first thing I did, as a territorial governor, is make my own decision, I guess, that for the near term, tourism was the answer. And we didn't have any tourist facilities [on the neighbor islands]. We had Kona Inn, and that was about it. And so I put together a top level group headed by a planner, Walter Collins. And it had private [sector] people, it had contractors, it had financiers, it had planners, and architects, and it was a group of about fifteen. And I said, "I want you to make a study of the neighbor islands—of all of the territory—and tell me where are the best tourist destination areas." And it was called a Tourist Destination Area Study. It concluded and gave me a good report in about six, eight months, that there were about twenty-one places that they labeled triple A in various islands, each one of which was larger than Waikīkī. But they didn't have water or roads in some cases.

And so I started my capital projects agenda to use state efforts to develop the roads, and in some cases, harbors or airports, whatever was necessary, to try to open up these areas. And look around the state today, and every one of them that has developed, is one of those areas that was designated in that [report], and most of the roads. . . . for instance at Kā'anapali, which was one of the early ones, Amfac was ready to get started there, but the roads, the state highway, ran right along the ocean. So, we put in the capital improvement program right away, to move that road back, so that you have beach area for development of resorts. And, well, that was one of the major elements in the agenda.

DT: So, you decided to run for governor [in 1959].

WQ: To run for governor.

DT: You weren't going to go for—the U.S. Senate wasn't that well paid in those days either, was it?

WQ: And that was another factor, but neither was the governorship.

DT: No.

WQ: But the governorship did have a home.

DT: But with a large family, you had to get to Washington, so . . .

WQ: Yeah.

DT: So you decided to stand pat and you had pretty united support for running as a Republican?

WQ: Among the Republicans, I think that Sam [Samuel Wilder] King, who had been, if you recall, after he left the territorial governorship, was elected to the [territorial] house of representatives. And Sam King was going to run against me.

DT: Oh, he was?

WQ: Yes, he was. And the King faction would have been strongly opposed to me and could have been a very powerful influence in that. Some of them, I think, remained inimical in any event, but unfortunately, Sam died. One of the big early questions, and it was fraught with all kinds of politics, [was that] it was up to me to name the date of the [special] election within a four-month period. And after due deliberation, I named it, I think, something like sixty days after the signing of the bill.

DT: And as for your lieutenant governor, did you make an arrangement as to who the lieutenant governor would be?

WQ: We had a lot of talk about that, and there were a lot of people that were vying—well, and there were several that did run. But I did give a great deal of thought to that because I wanted to get a representative team together if I could. And I had known Jimmie [James] Kealoha while he was chairman of Hawai'i County. And I liked Jimmie, I'd done him some favors over there in the area of trying to develop the economies of the neighbor islands. And I thought that getting a neighbor islander and a Hawaiian would be a very good move. And I talked to Jimmie and we decided. I've made no bones about it. We were a team, and I'm sure that helped. It also did a couple of things, however, that were unfortunate. Because when we ran, in those days, the governor and lieutenant governor ran separately. And the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union] supported Jimmie but didn't support me, at least not very enthusiastically. I did get support because they didn't take me seriously enough. I got support from Kaua'i and Maui, particularly from the ILWU members.

But at any rate, so when we were elected, Jimmie got more votes than I did. And so right away, he thought, "Look, I've got to have my fair share of the power in this as we become a state." And the first thing was, he wanted 50 percent of all appointments. And I said, "Jimmie, I just can't possibly do that. I've the constitutional obligation to make these things, and you're ready, willing, and able, and when we can consult, and as often as we can consult and so forth, we can and should do it."

Well then, we got into two battles almost immediately. The first appointments I was going to make were judges before I did anything else. And the first thing there, was the supreme court judges.

And I'm going to interrupt that story about Jimmie for a minute to tell you this one, because you won't believe it, when you remember about Judge [Robert] Bork and so forth. Because I chose a representative—very top level, there's never been a supreme court like it since. It (was) headed by Wilfred Tsukiyama, but it had a woman. It had a Democrat, Cable Wirtz. Rhoda Lewis was a woman who was politically neutral, Charlie [Charles E.] Cassidy who headed a big firm here in town, and the five people were really top-notch. [The fifth member of the Hawai'i supreme court in 1959 was Masaji Marumoto, a Republican.] And so I sent these five down to the senate [for confirmation]. We had a special session starting right after the election, and the senate alone came in for confirmations. Incidentally, there were four sessions between the time of statehood and the first regular session in February—in January.

DT: Four. Specials. Uh huh.

WQ: So I'm waited upon by Vince Esposito, Tom Gill, and I don't know whether it's Masato Doi—was he in the. . . . Somebody, I can't—any rate.

DT: He was still in the house, I think, yeah.

WQ: But these were senators then, after the statehood election.

DT: No, he may well have been, yeah.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: It could have been Masato. [Masato Doi was not a legislator in 1959. WQ may be referring to Nelson Doi, state senator from the Big Island.]

WQ: But any rate, and they came to me and they said, "You know, Governor," and I knew these guys, you know, I've known them for years, some of them, Vince in particular. And Vince was the spokesman. And he said, "Under the constitution, we have the power to advise and consent. And we construe that to mean that we, as eleven twenty-fifths of the senate, have the right to name eleven twenty-fifths of these appointments."

And I laughed, and I said, "You're out of your mind," you know. "That isn't what it means and certainly not the way I'm going to operate."

And then they said this, and look back in history and see what happened. They said, "Then, Governor, we are going to vote against every single appointment that you make." And they did. Eleven solid votes against every single person, and what happened? Bob [Robert F.] Ellis, one of the best public servants I had ever known [WQ's administrative assistant 1957-59], and I want to make him—because I've got important thoughts about land programs. And here it is twenty, thirty years later and John Waihee's in it once again. But at any rate, I wanted to make Bob head of the Department of Land and Natural Resources. He had a run-in with Randy Crossley at the closing moments of the first reorganization bill session, the first special session. And because of that, Randy had caused that session to expire without ever passing that reorganization bill.

I had gone away two days before the end of that after talking to Elmer [Cravalho, speaker of the house] and Doc Hill [William Hill, president of the senate], and saying, "Look, I've been asked—[Vice President Richard M.] Nixon can't make it to speak to this business council on the West Coast." And I said, "It's made up of the top business people in the country, and I want to tell [them] that we're sun-tanned and gilt-edged, and we want to get our message to these people."

And they said, "Go ahead, Governor, everything's all fixed. This reorganization bill is just gonna fly through."

I finished my speech in California, come back to four urgent telephone messages. And sure enough, it had gone and terminated without passing the bill. So I come back and we set up a new special session, we talk about it in advance, and it was a five-day session, three days pass over, and the other two days, ten minutes a day, something like that.

But, then we get to these confirmations, and I go to Bob Ellis, and Randy is still mad at me and he's mad at Bob Ellis. And he got one other Republican, who was very responsive to the ILWU on Maui, and they voted with the eleven Democrats who were solid against all my

appointments. So Bob Ellis just didn't make it. And that went on and on. Larry [Lawrence K.] Nakatsuka was an appointee. He didn't make it because the ILWU remembered the stories he'd written [in the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*] about the strike in 1947, or '46, I think.

DT: In the *Bulletin*, yeah.

WQ: And they didn't want him. And they were able to get two Republicans to move over, again thirteen, twelve.

CC: Was your lieutenant governor working against you behind the scenes, with the ILWU, you know?

WQ: Not at that time, in those early appointments. But when we got to the next level of appointments, and then he started to say, "Well, now, I want my fair share of these." And I said that we can't. He said, "Well, there's one that I had promised." I had committed that I would pass all my judicial appointments through the [Hawai'i] Bar Association, to see that they were qualified, and if the Bar said, we don't think this person is qualified to be a judge, then I wouldn't appoint him. And this one was an existing territorial judge. And he was a strong, close personal friend of Jimmie Kealoha's. And Jimmie had said, "I'll get your reappointment." And the [Hawai'i] Bar Association said, "No, we do not approve this man. He's been guilty of misconduct in handling masters, ships, and things like that in the circuit court."

So here, I've got my lieutenant governor, and he's saying, "I've promised it, I have to have it," you know. And at the very early stage, I can't just eschew him, you know, cut him off on this one thing. I've already told him he can't—he can consult but he can't have half. And so I called the [Hawai'i] Bar Association. And Bert Kobayashi [president of the bar], you know Bert.

DT: Mm hmm.

WQ: And I think Bill Stephenson [William B. Stephenson, president of the Hawai'i Bar Association] was still alive then. And they came over [to my] office, and I said, "We've got to find some way to do this, where your bar isn't going to come out and say this governor has gone back on his word and everything, and yet I've got to try to accommodate my lieutenant governor."

And they said, "We'll go along with you if you put him on a neighbor island where he can't do so much damage." And that's exactly what I did.

DT: Okay. And that's where we are going to have to stop for now because we're out of tape.

JC: Okay, this is the end of the session with Governor Quinn, and we'll continue on some time in the near future, part two.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape No. 17-2-2-88

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

William F. Quinn (WQ)

March 9, 1988

Honolulu, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. (DT)

Joy Chong: The following is an interview with William Quinn. It took place on March 9, 1988. It's a continuation of an interview which we did about a month prior to this. This is tape number six of the interview. We left off on tape number five in the prior interview.

CC: Governor, we're going to back up a little bit. I think we actually had you in office when we left off before, but one of the things we neglected, and I suppose no interview with you is quite complete without some discussion of that '59 campaign and your Second Mahele campaign, and . . .

WQ: Yes.

DT: . . . can you please tell me, where did that idea come from? Was that solely your thinking or did you have some prompting on that?

WQ: The idea of using the state lands to reach various social purposes, including the need for additional agricultural land and for farmers and homes, and that sort of thing, had developed over a long period of time with meetings over a year or more. I have to say that the name was entirely my own. And that was the biggest mistake of that whole campaign. (Chuckles) I was flying back from the Mainland, where I'd been in Washington, and I was reviewing a talk I was going to give on land policy in Maui. And it came to me that, by golly, this is really using the lands or distributing lands as best we can, in a fashion to meet certain social purposes and so forth, and was very much like Kamehameha III had done with the Great Mahele. And I know more about that now than I did then, or I would never have done that—use the name. I thought, well, this would be a good thing, so I called it that in that speech. And then I was stuck with it from there on. The other thing, though, that you may be referring to, was that there was some ads put out during that time, fifty bucks an acre thing. And that was prompted largely by people who were involved in the promotion and couple of those, I think, hit the press before I had even seen them. And Aku [Hal Lewis a.k.a. J. Akuhead Pupule] was very active in that.

DT: Yes, I was going to say, wasn't Aku the—he took credit, actually from various times, for having conceived the whole idea of the Second Mahele, and . . .

WQ: Well, he didn't invent the name, I wish I could blame him for it in the first place. And [in]

the second place, I would say that he took and ran with certain segments of it on the air, that fifty bucks an acre was one of them, but that was not the concept. And as you probably will remember, we did eventually get certain parts of the bill or bills passed. And I'll tell you another story about that in a minute.

We used the concept, for instance, when we had the volcano [eruption], and farmers [at Lālāmilo] were wiped out. We took state land, and we made that state land available on a drawing-by-lot basis. That's the key. That was the key because everything was being bid up so rapidly and the state had to auction off land, and so you couldn't make it available to the people you wanted to make it available to. And so the key of this whole thing was to make it available on a drawing-by-lot basis, at a fair value, which would not be increased by demand. And so we did it for the farmers there, for the people that were displaced, and we did it for the displaced businesses in the Hilo tidal wave, and then we did it for the Lālāmilo farm lands, and we did it several places, and it proved itself. But it was also a damning thing to me in the 1962 elections just because of that term more than anything else, and the fact of the—oh, yeah, give away thousands and thousands of acres of state land at fifty bucks an acre, and who's going to put in the streets and the sewers and so forth and so on.

CC: So it did come back to haunt you a little bit.

WQ: Oh, yeah. I think it was probably a major issue against me in 1962.

DT: And then along was Kealoha's defection probably, and . . .

WQ: Well, that was certainly quite an important, also.

DT: A second factor in '62.

WQ: And probably the most important of all—I think I could have survived either one of those two. But I think the most important of all, was that I had a considerable following on the neighbor islands from the union people. In 1959, the ILWU particularly, just didn't take me seriously, said, "He ain't got a chance, you know, not against Jack Burns." And so, if people on the neighbor islands wanted to support me, they supported me, and they had the signs up, and everything else, and I got a considerable vote on the neighbor islands from the union groups. But in 1962, those same people put their signs up, and they were torn down the first night they went up. And there was a very strong militant campaign against me which scared some of those people, and I think that was a major factor.

DT: You did very well in '59, too, in what you might call the enlarged or extended Kalihi, [O'ahu] area; whereas, in '62, you lost that.

WQ: Yes, now . . .

DT: It went back to the Democrats.

WQ: Well, yes. A certain amount of, I don't know whether it was just Kalihi, but I lost a lot of the Japanese vote that I had had. I'd campaigned very well in '59 in various areas that are predominantly voters of Japanese ancestry, and I did quite well. In '62, there was a strong effort in that respect, too, because Dan [Daniel K. Inouye] was running against Ben

[Benjamin] Dillingham, I think. It was readily apparent that Ben was not going to be any competition for Dan for the [U.S.] Senate seat. And so Dan and Matsy [Matsuo Takabuki] and Masato Doi and so forth, they just started going out in all these areas, you know, just really working hard. And if I saw one, I saw four or five people [who] had been strong supporters of mine in that particular community, who [later] came to me and literally said, one with tears in her eyes, "Well, I was so sure that you were going to win, but they were asking me to vote with them, you know. And so I said I would because I didn't feel it would make any difference in your campaign anyhow."

DT: Well, the Democrats also buried the hatchet in terms of their factional quarrels in '62.

WQ: That is correct. That is correct. When they got back Tom Gill and so forth, and they got the AFL-CIO faction behind them. I'd gotten it in '59, and then, I think, quickly lost it—or at least if I didn't lose it, I lost some of its strength in its support because the AFL leadership came to me and said, "Well, here's who we want you to appoint as [director] of labor [and industrial relations]."

And I said, "Well, I can't really hand away that."

And they said, "Well, you said you would."

"No, I said I want to listen to you and I would certainly want to have somebody appointed who would be acceptable to you and to the ILWU and all unions." But they felt that I owed them the right to name that person. And that had some effect, too, particularly among the leadership. And as you know, the leader [Robert Hasegawa] then, subsequently, became director of labor with Jack [Burns]. [Burns' first director of the department of labor and industrial relations in 1962 was Alfred Laureta. He later was succeeded by Hasegawa, who was tied to the AFL-CIO.]

DT: You also suffered some unfortunate publicity about, what's often remembered as a sort of a prison fiasco on the department of social services.

WQ: Oh, that was one of the toughest things I ever went through in my life. That was really difficult because [when] we started, of course, we put together all of those independent agencies and bureaus and everything into eighteen departments. And that meant we took the department of social services and department of institutions, for instance, and we put it together. This was under strong, strong advice by the consultants we had on the whole reorganization. But that meant that somebody had to be the boss. Mary Noonan had been a department head for quite a long time. The prison was part of [the department of] institutions, Joe [C.] Harper was the warden [of O'ahu Prison], but he had not had a department head's situation, [so] I put it together under Mary Noonan. And within three or four months, it was obvious that things were rocking, and rocking badly. And I couldn't quite put my finger on just what was happening.

I knew that Joe was very unhappy, and Mary seemed to be very distressed that her views were being honored in the breach as head of the department [of social services], and so I . . . George Chaplin told me about a fellow by the name of Ed [Edward P.] Shaw, who was a visiting professor [of labor and industrial relations and personnel] at the University [of Hawai'i], and that Ed, who was an economist, had also been very experienced in analyzing

some of the internal personnel problems in major departments. He had done such a thing for, I think it was one of the naval stations on the Mainland. And so I got in touch with Ed, and it seemed that he would be quite willing to do this as a consultant to me. We got to be good friends. Ed, unfortunately, died just about six weeks ago.

DT: Oh really?

WQ: Yeah, on the Mainland, living in San Antonio. But Ed was a bright guy. He retired out here, and we used to play some golf together, although he was much better than I. Ed completed his report [which included a survey of department staff] after some time, and he came in to review it with me before it was made public at all, and the conclusion on the last page was, Mary Noonan has to go.

Well, Mary Noonan had long preceded me in Republican politics and had been chairman of the Republican party the time I made my very first speech as a Republican. And she was, of course, the spokesman for the old wing of the party, and here I'm being told that the only real solution is to ask her to resign. Well, I talked to Ed as much as I could about that, but he said that's really it. And so I said already, all right. So Mary and I, I guess, had two meetings over two or three days, and the press had an inkling that something was happening, and they were all out there speculating. And Mary was alternately, extremely angry and in tears. And finally, I just said, "Well, this is what I have to do." So I did, but that was the grist for a great deal of newspaper stories, and not necessarily very favorable. It went on for quite a period of time.

DT: Yeah. It stayed on for a long period of time. I think you failed to mention, didn't she earlier fire Joe Harper from his position?

WQ: Yes, I think that's true.

DT: And then he tried to get his position back, . . .

WQ: That is correct.

DT: . . . ultimately had a long court battle, so it actually . . .

WQ: Well, even after she left . . .

DT: . . . dragged on long after . . .

WQ: . . . he was trying to get his position back.

DT: Long after your administration.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: Mm hmm.

CC: Actually, one of the major jobs you faced, despite problems like that, which were major problems, was the whole business of reorganizing what had been a territorial government and

fashioning a state government.

WQ: Ho, and the problems were not solved when I left the office. I mean, they were still in the process. But the very first one—I don't know whether we've talked about this before—but it is so unique. And I was reminded of it when we get into the advise and consent process with Bork, you know . . .

DT: Mm hmm.

WQ: . . . just not too long ago. But I probably told you, so stop me if I'm repeating myself. Tom Gill and Vince Esposito, and somebody else came to see me. Did I tell you that story? And they said that . . .

CC: Yes.

WQ: I think I did.

DT: Go ahead, go ahead.

WQ: Well at any rate, and they said, "Well, we think advise and consent means that we get to name our percentage."

And I said, "No, it doesn't."

Percentage—and so the first thing down was judges. And so they told me that they would not vote in favor of any of my appointees if I did not give them the right to name eleven twenty-fifths. Of course, I refused to do that. They voted against my appointees, and I lost some very good appointees. And that, to me, is unique in anything I've ever read in history, that at the beginning of statehood, at any time, a party would just say, "Well, we're just not going to vote for anybody, no matter what the qualifications are because we feel, politically, that we're entitled to something." I don't ever remember a senate doing anything like that.

Another phase, of course, was that we had to put all these departments together and it took maybe two years, because we had to get a reorganization bill. And then that bill had to be passed, and we had special sessions to pass that. But then, it had to be implemented. And this is in terms of letting some people go, changing the jobs of other people, changing the locations of people. And then some of those had to be further implemented by additional legislation. So that was a period that was going on, I think, some of it was still going on when I left office in 1962, although the concepts of reorganization had been adopted in the original reorganization bill, which we had presented to the legislature in a special session right after statehood.

One of the other things was that there was a number of laws that governed the territory, which were federal laws, and which went out of existence two years after statehood. And so there was a special emphasis to try to get such laws passed by the state, before we ended up without any laws. And I guess one of the most important of those was antitrust law because the federal antitrust law applied to territorial commerce. But when we became a state, it did not apply to state commerce as a [Department of] Interior matter. And of course, the federal law, since Hawai'i was so far away from the Mainland, had largely been honored in the

breach because [the] federal government didn't care what happened in the interior commerce of the territory of Hawai'i, and we had people [in] interlocking directorates who were all over the place, you know. And so the attorney general made a study of that and laid it all out and it was just astonishing the way the people in the major agricultural corporations also sat on the [boards of directors of] banks and also sat on the trust companies and sat on each other's boards. (Chuckles) Things of that nature, and so that was a major effort. And within that then, was the effort before we actually put this into place to get all these people, look, we are going to enforce this, and therefore, you had better attend and clean up your act. And that took quite a bit of time. Of course, in many cases, I was dealing with friends of mine who had been my supporters who were saying what the hell are you doing, you know. (Chuckles)

DT: Why did we put you in there? (Chuckles)

WQ: Yeah, just to do this. But it ended up that by the time we put the law in place, most of that had been cleaned up. In some cases, we had disputes with those who said, "No, it's perfectly all right for me to do this." It was only a threat of actually taking him to court that they finally agreed.

DT: Let's stop right there. You want to change tapes?

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: And we're now on tape number seven, continuation of interview with William Quinn.

DT: All righty, I think right after the '62 election [in which WQ was defeated by Burns in the race for Governor], you moved, well, a passage of two or three years, you went into law practice and into the Dole Corporation . . .

WQ: That's correct.

DT: You don't go directly to Dole.

WQ: No, I was in the practice of law. I looked around for a bit, and I guess, the first of January of 1963, I'd joined what had been Moore, Torkildson and Rice, a law firm. Bud [Ernest Carroll] Moore, [Jr.] headed that law firm, and it became Quinn and Moore. And then I was there just about two years. And at that time, I got increasing pressure to see if I would take the job over at Dole that they'd been looking for somebody for about a year or so to take. They had a nationwide search, and they ended up with me, and so I took it.

DT: And then you sort of retired, but you must have still kept an eye on . . .

WQ: I didn't retire . . .

DT: . . . what was happening politically. You retired from politics, I'm saying.

WQ: Oh.

DT: Yeah. And you kept an eye on what was happening politically. Did it surprise you that Burns moved so rapidly to make peace with the business community? Here he'd been an ILWU

candidate and dyed-in-the-wool, and all of a sudden, I think he surprised even his party by the rapidity with which he moved to bring in, sort of rapprochement between the Downtown community and the ILWU and those factions.

WQ: No, I don't think that surprised me very much. Even in my day, you had almost an equal number on both sides as far as financial support is concerned. You know, the business community is not, and probably rightly so, motivated particularly by principle, political principle, you know. They're fairly expedient in that regard. And Jack was in power and he was willing to listen, and so they were quite eager to become part of it, I think.

DT: On balance, it was quite an astute political move, though, wasn't it, on his part?

WQ: Yeah, it was indeed, sure.

DT: Mm hmm. But you didn't stay out of politics completely, at least we were able to recruit your services. I say "we," the community, was able to recruit your services in the early 1970s to serve on the Honolulu Charter Commission.

WQ: That's right, that was my second charter commission.

DT: Yes. You'd served on the one . . .

WQ: Served on the original one.

DT: The original one back in '57 or '58, I believe.

WQ: Yeah. It started in '54.

DT: Yeah, but it didn't really get operating until, I think it was '57, because . . .

WQ: Yeah, because I left it in '56 when I ran for territorial senate and then I didn't go back to it. I went back to—I then became member of the statehood commission.

DT: I thought you'd gone back to it.

WQ: No.

DT: I may be mistaken, mm hmm.

WQ: But I did work on it. That was a long job, that first charter because I was with it about a year and a half, and it still was another year or more before it went [on] the ballot.

DT: Now, that was a result of the home rule . . .

WQ: That's correct.

DT: . . . passage in the territorial legislature.

WQ: That had passed.

DT: At any rate, you have any recollections? That charter [is] still in effect till this day, I believe, that you worked on.

WQ: I think there were some amendments that have been passed. In fact, there was a whole new charter commission, but they called it a charter review commission, and they tinkered here and there, but not a great deal.

DT: And nothing passed as a result of that. They have had a few individual . . .

WQ: Individual changes. Now that's right. It didn't—nothing passed.

DT: Yeah, the whole thing collapsed on itself.

WQ: Yeah, that's right. No, it's a—I think, and I speak now as a longtime official of the National Municipal League which concerns itself very much with charters. I think the Honolulu City Charter is an outstanding charter. The only thing that I would say is that if we were meeting today on some of the basic questions, such as, should Honolulu [have] a strong city mayor or not, I think, most of the consultants and I, myself, would go the other way. In 1955, when we were dealing with that question, and I think the public administration service and even the national, particularly, and the National Municipal League, were recommending that there be a mayor who would be sort of the honorary head of state, or head of city, and that there be a city manager who would be the professional to handle the day-to-day matters of sewers and roads and water and what have you. And we, on the charter commission, ended up opposing that with, I think, agreement from the consultants because we had the mayor of Honolulu as the chief officer that we elected. And we felt that that was important, that there be somebody like that, that people could vote for and would be their candidate and their person in office. But with statehood, I don't think we need that anymore, and I think we do have a lot of problems that come out of the relationship between city and state that are not necessarily that helpful to the growth of the state [of Hawai'i] and the city of Honolulu. And if I were to do it all over again, I might well call for a city manager.

DT: Yeah. Bob Dodge seemed to be of that opinion all the way through.

WQ: But Bob . . .

DT: Interestingly enough, because he'd been an old devotee of this National Municipal League.

WQ: That's right. See, he was—in fact, I'm on it today and I'm a member, I'm chairman of the All-America City Award jury. But I got on it originally when Bob Dodge said, "I'm going to leave it and I want somebody, and I would think that Bill Quinn would be the one."

DT: That's an interesting example, I think, of bipartisan, shall we say, cooperation.

WQ: That's right. But Bob was, you're quite right, and he had a graduate degree in municipal administration or something, and he was all for a managing director, no matter what. But most of us felt that since that was the highest [elective] political office we had, we ought to have a political campaign for it.

DT: You know, many people look upon that as one of your great contributions, in addition to

being the first governor. They look upon that, your contributions to that charter . . .

WQ: Well, I certainly look on that as something . . .

DT: Both times. Your . . .

WQ: . . . that I was very . . .

DT: . . . first time and then the latest time in the 1970s.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: But then you didn't stop quite there. You went one step further, and got back into politics, and I have to mention this (chuckles).

WQ: Sure, please do. Yeah, well we go to . . .

DT: Trying to [defeat] Sparky [Spark M.] Matsunaga.

WQ: Hiram Fong was quitting [in 1976]. And there was nobody to run for the Senate of the United States. And I certainly didn't want to, I'd only been with this firm, then, four years or something like that, four or five years. But you don't let a seat go by default, and there was nobody around. And so I had some polls taken. I had great name recognition, and everything else, you know, and it looked like the chances were there, except what I probably knew, but wouldn't totally face up to, was the fact that I'd been out for fourteen years, and Sparky'd been running every two years for twenty-two. [Matsunaga had been in the territorial house since 1954, and the U.S. House between 1962 and 1976.] (Chuckles) And that itself made a lot of difference. And so I started high and stayed right where I was, and didn't move a bit. (Chuckles) He passed me right by.

DT: Well, the polls, sometimes, are not as accurate as they might be, too. I think one of your problems, quite frankly, a personal opinion only, that you didn't have the name recognition that Sparky Matsunaga had. And it seems almost impossible for some of us to believe that, but in actuality, it really was true. A lot of people had forgotten that you had been the first governor . . .

WQ: Well, most of the polls said I had the name recognition. There was a lot of things that were, you know, just—oh, yeah, well I know the name Bill Quinn, and that sort of thing. Because it wasn't all that long afterwards, but there were a lot of things—Second Mahele was used against me even then.

DT: Really?

WQ: Yeah, sure. And another thing that was used against me was, and this was a story made up out of whole cloth, but while I was in the practice of law, I had defended [the] son of [a Dole Corporation executive], who had a bad automobile accident, and his passenger was killed. He was charged with negligent homicide, which in those days, was a felony. And I remember I was called the night of the accident by [the executive] "Can you help me?"

Well, that wasn't generally my cup of tea, but I started talking to some other lawyers who might have been more in the criminal field, and I thought that maybe I better do this one myself. And so we did do the trial, and I did get him off. And then about four or five months later, I took the job at Dole. And the story was all around about a big payoff, and that sort of thing, you know. And that was damaging, and that was all where, I didn't even hear about that until after the election. It was all over the place by word of mouth.

DT: At any rate, it didn't work out, I guess.

WQ: It did not work out.

DT: Well, can we reflect just a little bit, Chris, do you think . . .

CC: Sure.

DT: . . . we should do a little bit of reflection?

CC: I think it would be good to do that. In fact, I was kind of interested to hear that—I thought that dirty campaigns were just invented last year.

(Laughter)

WQ: I think they'd been around as long as politics has been around. I've just been recently reading about the various speculation on the conviction of Socrates. It was back around even in those days, I guess.

DT: Probably the caveman had problems of the same sort.

(Laughter)

CC: But maybe we could look back and, of course, we've had a little discussion about the Burns administration, but following Burns, George Ariyoshi became governor, and I just wonder how you assess his terms in office. He was one of the folks that you said, broke with the Democrats, back when you were fighting some of those battles as governor. How do you assess . . .

WQ: Well, I say, with no modesty at all, that I think that Jack, and following him, George, put together one terrific, powerful group that were able to attain and retain and maintain power and control. But I think there were a great many things that should have been done that were not done, some of which were started in my days. And I guess, maybe in part because they were started in my day, they were treated like Eileen [Anderson, mayor of Honolulu] treated HART [Honolulu Area Rapid Transit] when she came in, get rid of it.

Like the whole Kona [Hawai'i] Plan, which should have been back then—bits and pieces were done over the next twelve or fourteen years, finally the new airport, then finally the road. And those things were part of a plan that was developed over [William] "Doc" Hill's vigorous objections in 1960 and '61, and they were part of a total plan and those capital improvements should have gone right ahead. This was one example.

DT: [Hill] very subsequently became quite a promoter . . .

WQ: That's right.

DT: . . . of the Kona Plan.

WQ: But that was ten years later.

DT: Mm hmm. Right, it was.

WQ: Yeah. And there are a number of other things. So I can't say—I can say that they were good, sound, solid people in office. I'd always liked both of them. But my own view is that with this young state, it was still a very young state, there was a lot of things that should have been done that weren't done.

DT: The feeling seems to abound in some corners that the Ariyoshi administration was more of a caretaker administration than being an innovative administration.

WQ: Well, that's the way it appears to me.

DT: Mm hmm. And so we come down to the present, I guess, unless you have something to interject, Chris.

CC: No, go ahead, Dan.

DT: You weren't given all the recognition that one might expect the first state governor would receive during [the] Burns and Ariyoshi years, but apparently, our new governor now, in office a couple of years, [John] Waihee has turned to you for a little bit of advice. Is that true or is it just a line in a headline someplace?

WQ: No. I guess there were two lines. The first one was that I got a nice personal invitation to go to hear his inaugural address, which had never happened before, and so I went. And some reporters were asking me about that, "Yeah, this is the first time." So they made something of that in the press.

And then, the governor asked me to take this chairmanship of the advisory board on geothermal [i.e., chair of the Governor's Advisory Board on the Underwater Cable Transmission Project], which is a major, major project, if it can ever be accomplished. And so I've gotten heavily immersed in that, now, and have sort of become the spokesman. Just yesterday, we were over on the Big Island with the board—which is a blue ribbon board if you've ever had one—and took a helicopter ride over this whole area, and met with the executive committee of various Puna community associations. And I handled all their questions for an hour or so, and had lunch with them and came back. So I've sort of become the spokesman on that. It's a long way between now and the day there will ever be such a project, but it's a very exciting thing. It could be an enormous benefit to the state if it can ever be done.

DT: Can you really visualize that one of these days, electricity will be piped from the Big Island to O'ahu?

- WQ: Everybody acknowledges it's feasible, Dan. It's been studied by a state-federal study commission since 1983 or [8]4. And their study will be finished in 1990 or '91, but they've already designed the cable, and they've already laid out the areas of the water, I mean of the underground of the ocean, where it ought to be laid, and various things like that. We had a meeting in November with five international cable and electric companies of major proportions—one from Sweden, one from Norway, one, Pirelli, from Italy, and one from France, and one, Sumitomo, from Japan. And they want to go. They said we don't have to wait, and we know it can be done, but what the real problem is, how to get together a permitting process here in the state that doesn't take twenty-seven different permits with contested cases and this and that on each one. So it just is bureaucratically unable to go forward.
- DT: Do you see this—not the present session of the legislature, but the next session of the legislature coming up—do you see the geothermal issue being one of the major ones that they have to face this next session?
- WQ: Geothermal has been a major issue for the last two or three sessions. And they've made more and more steps to try to make it easier, including declaration of geothermal zones, no contested cases in certain areas, various things like that. Money available for research, and so forth. We proposed to the governor in an interim report, two bills. One to create an authority, which could then centralize all of this and act with a little bit more than an advisory board that isn't even confirmed by the senate, you know. And which would then try to bring all of these things together and then go out and maybe formulate the plans and ask these major, possible participants to make their proposals, because we're looking for mainly private enterprise to do this. That bill, I think, went in and didn't get much of a hearing.
- CC: They had a hearing this session, now.
- WQ: Senator [Richard M.] Matsuura came up in the first hearing, and boom, right back down. But the other one, the permitting bill, which names a lead agency and puts all the city and county and state permits, except health, all in one under the lead agency with a single permit to cover all aspects of it, with full public hearings, you know, whenever and wherever you have to have them—but one time.
- DT: One time, mm hmm.
- WQ: And also inviting the federal government to participate for the federal permits and everything. And that's alive and may well pass. And that would be a big step forward.
- DT: Ultimately, however, we are probably going to have to come back to a government corporation, or something analogous to the TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] here locally, a water authority, or a electrical authority.
- WQ: Well, the [Hawaiian] Electric Company is opposed to that because they feel it's a step toward public power.
- DT: Oh, I see.
- WQ: And we think also, and with some good reason, that if there can be a consortia of companies

which, after some state money is spent, additional money for research and the private people over there now, spend their research to assure the resource is there in sufficient quantity to develop, say, 500 megawatts of power. That then, we think that could move forward and that the technique and capital and everything is there to deliver 500 megawatts to O'ahu, to be introduced into the grid.

DT: Right.

WQ: And that Hawaiian Electric would then buy it. And that they'd—and the projections that we got—some preliminary economic projections and so forth—which indicate that this could be a very profitable thing for investors.

DT: We are at the end of this tape, and I don't know if we want to . . .

JC: We're now going to tape number eight, the continuation of interview with William Quinn.

DT: Governor, during the heights of your—when you were governor of the state of Hawai'i, and also governor of the territory, where you had, what might be known as a competitive two-party system, from about 1955 to 1962, the Democratic party was on the upswing, the Republican party still had a reasonably well-organized entity, which had been extremely well organized back in the early [19]50s, operating. Yet today, we have virtually a shell of these two organizations. The Democrats, even though they were in control of state government, didn't really modernize their organization. And the Republicans, of course, became so discouraged after you left office. And then Hiram Fong, of course, as you've alluded to earlier, left office, and Neal Blaisdell—we might mention him—that they failed to contribute [funds]. And I guess, the Republican party today, in the state of Hawai'i, such as it is, is about \$60[,000] or a \$100,000 in debt. Do you have a reaction to this? You must have some feeling.

WQ: Yes, I do. And I think I probably have to take a portion of the blame on that. I could have done some things in a different way. But let me start this way. As you know, the Republican party had controlled things for fifty years, up to 1954. And when the Democrats took over the legislature in 1954, those Republicans that were around, were the same Republicans that had been around for quite some time. No new faces in there. In '56, I ran and was defeated for territorial senate. And in '56, I mean, I was about the only new face on the block, and as you probably will remember, I ran ahead of Joe Itagaki, and ran ahead of Mary K. Robinson in the primary and so forth. And then in the general, I ran way ahead of them.

DT: It was close, very close.

WQ: And almost beat Herb [Herbert K. H.] Lee. So then, I [eventually] get into office [as governor], and I'm conscious of two things. One, as a new state in '59, I felt that I wanted to give it as precedent, the best possible thing I could. And so on many boards and commissions, I gave it bipartisan, like I did the Supreme Court, you know. And right on through, circuit judges and all these others. I think, had I had the type of experience that Jack Burns had had and so forth, I probably would not have been thinking that idealistically for the benefit of the state. I'll set this pattern and people will follow it, type of thing. I would have taken all those Quinn Republicans and put them in every single position. And I think we'd probably still be there.

DT: (Chuckles) At least their descendants would still be there.

WQ: Yes. That's one thing. And then the other thing was, that I was aware of it in terms of political platforms and political policies and political achievements. And I was unable, just to give you an example, in, I don't know, '60, maybe in the first major legislative session after those five or six we had between '59 and February of '60. But at that time, we put together, through the Republican convention first, about an eighteen-point platform. And we had it adopted by the party. And then we put it through a whole legislative process. And we had the bills, one through twenty, the Republican program, and it was a good program. I mean, I would swear by it today, just because it was so good for the people. One of them was land [reform].

And the next thing was that when we—when the senate—when the legislature convened, bills one through twenty went from the administration down, together with all the talk I could give and everything else, but it went to Doc Hill, who had his own organization and his own empire; Pop [Julian R., Sr.] Yates, who had his own organization empire; Heb [D. Hebden] Porteus, and I could go on and on and on. And it got down there, and instead of being, here's the Republican program, one through twenty and let's go, and let's really ride it, and let's make it that which will get the recognition and so forth, one bill went in as bill number eight, another one went in as bill twenty-eight, another one in at forty-five, and so forth, then it lost its entire identity. And that, also, I think, is a major reason why the Republican party didn't come off any stronger than it did in those few years that I was there.

I was, as you know, considered a—oh, I don't know what you call it, the word escapes me, but I was an accident. That's what they—the Democrats thought so, and I think the Republicans probably did, too. I was elected. The Democrats still had full control of the house. I did carry a slight majority of Republicans with me for those three years. And as you know, from the appointment standpoint, too, I lost a number of appointments just because I couldn't even hold those thirteen Republicans together. If Randy Crossley wanted to quit, boom, I'd lose something. And so it went. But I think those are a couple of straight political things that gave rise to it.

Then when I was defeated, and I remember in 1964, in the early days, I happen to have been vocal on behalf of Nelson Rockefeller [candidate for Republican nomination for U.S. president], but I was more vocal on behalf of a unified party here. And I made speeches on unification all over the state in that year of late 1963 and early '64, I guess. And of course, Barry [Goldwater] was the big man on the other side, and Barry was considerably more to the right than I was. But didn't make any difference. You know, we're Republicans first, and we'll select a candidate and we'll all back 'em.

And then a bunch of—as we went along—a bunch of Mainland Republicans from the Goldwater group came down here and just started working, and first of all, just keep this guy Quinn from even going to the convention. I mean, the state convention even, you know. And they were really working hard. And it was about that time, that they say to me, "Well, come take this job and eventually be president of Dole." And then at that time, it's going to be—and then [eventually] you'll be president of Castle & Cooke, you know. And I thought well, that looks like a good alternative future, but they were saying, "If you do this, we've gotta ask you not to be quite that active in politics for a while." And so I think maybe that impacted me, somewhat, as far as getting out, and that left some void in leadership. And I

think I'm responsible for that, too.

DT: Well, certainly it happened. Still happening in terms of recent—the [Pat] Robertson effort to take over. The factionalism . . .

WQ: Yes, exactly.

DT: Sort of, hurts the party any way you look at it, but the fact is it has now persisted for twenty-five years, shall we say.

WQ: No new leadership has come up.

DT: Makes it tough. Would you care to speculate? Maybe you choose to not answer this question. Why have the Democrats been so lax about their party organization?

WQ: Yeah, I can speculate about that and I think it's like a repeat, almost exactly of what the Republicans did after fifty years in office. What the Democrats are doing after thirty-five years in office; and that is, soon as the people get in power, they want to hold on [to] that power, they don't want to build anything, they don't want to pass anything along. They've got theirs. And that's been the case. The Democrats have become fat and happy in office, and they don't want to see that change, and they're not interested in building a political party if the individuals are—and you look at some of the individuals. They're there now, and they were there then. Then, they were young, vigorous, idealistic guys, and now they're cigar-smoking people, sitting back and saying, "I've got mine."

DT: In other words, human nature changes very slowly.

WQ: Very slowly and very little. And in that connection, whether they have a strong political party or not, doesn't affect them that much, so long as they're in office, or have the power.

DT: And so it goes with politics.

WQ: And so it goes.

DT: I don't think I have anything more to say.

CC: No, I guess, no, I think that's. . . .

DT: We thank you . . .

CC: Start with politics and end with politics.

DT: We thank you very, very much.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape No. 17-2A-3-88

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

William F. Quinn (WQ)

1985

Honolulu, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC)

Joy Chong: The following is another interview conducted with William Quinn. The interviewer is Chris Conybeare. The interview deals with statehood. It was never transcribed [before], and it took place approximately in 1985. Date is unknown.

CC: Basically, we want to know why you worked so hard for statehood, and why did you think it was important for Hawai'i?

WQ: Well, why did I work for it, and why did I think it was important? I worked so hard for it because it was, not only important, it was absolutely a necessity for Hawai'i to become a state. It was the only thing that was consistent with the character of the United States, it was the only thing that the people of Hawai'i were really deserving of. You got to remember, and many of us don't, that in those days, the governor was imposed upon the people by a presidential appointment. The judges were imposed upon the people by presidential appointment. We didn't have any vote in the Congress of the United States, although we paid the taxes. So, it was a very fundamental matter of Democratic, Republican philosophy that these people here, in these islands, were deserving of statehood, and were first-class citizens and should be treated as such.

CC: Now, there were some opponents to statehood. Who were they, both here and in the Mainland, and what were their reasons for opposing statehood?

WQ: Well, I guess right after World War [II]—well, going back even before the war, I guess the first thing was that it was out of the question that anything that wasn't connected to the other forty-eight states should be a state. The non-contiguity argument was there for a long, long time.

And then, after the war, I think there was—well, we got so many, quote, Japs, unquote, out there, and why would we want to have them as a state? We just fought a war with them. And I think that was effectively overcome when the 442nd [Regimental Combat Team] and the 100th [Infantry Battalion] gathered here after the war, and of course, their record became better and better known as outstanding—in World War II—great American patriots. And then they took a trip to Texas and had a reunion with the Texas group that they had rescued in the war and so that, gradually, was overcome.

And then finally, it was a matter that there was a strong Communist influence. And that was due to the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union] and Harry Bridges as being thought in the Mainland to be the nation's leading, one of the nation's leading Communists. And there was a strong feeling that the ILWU was Communist-dominated. We had a Smith Act trial here, as you may remember. And that was really the problem that I was faced with, and had to deal with when I was going back, talking to Congress and so forth. I had to tell them that I thought that we—I may have been wrong when—I certainly wasn't wrong when I said we weren't Communist, but I may have been wrong when I said we're a strong two-party state. (Chuckles) Because at that time, I thought we would be. But at any rate, we finally overcame that one also.

CC: Speaking of the two-party state, what was your biggest disagreement with Jack Burns over the strategy for bringing Hawai'i into the union?

WQ: We really didn't have any disagreement in, I guess it was in early spring of 1958. We got together, Jack and I, and members of the statehood commission and so forth. At that time, it was urged by Jack and others that Hawai'i and Alaska ought to be separated. We didn't want to join the enemies of both against either, and [felt] that each should go its own way, and that maybe Alaska should be pressed first. And I think we all agreed with that strategy, that Alaska had less opposition at that time. But that once Alaska passed, it would open the door for Hawai'i.

Where we came into disagreement—and to this day, I don't know the answer to it—when the Alaskan bill passed, in about, let's say June of 1958, and it looked to us that there was another eight, ten weeks of Congressional session, and we knew that we had the votes in the House and we felt we had the votes in the Senate, we thought that we really ought to move then. And that was under the urging and advice of many of the strong Democrats in the House and Senate who were our friends, who said that if you let it go this particular congressional term, and it goes into the next, it's liable to get all jammed up with the Civil Rights Act debates, and so forth. Everybody knew that we [Hawai'i] would be strong for civil rights, whether we were Republican or Democrat. And at that time then, Lyndon Johnson and Jack Burns and the House leadership, all took the view that they weren't going to touch Hawai'i in the end of that term. And that's where we had a fundamental disagreement and rather a strong one.

CC: What do you think really led to the fact that you were able to defeat Jack in that first election afterwards? What were some of the major factors that were going on then, in terms of that campaign?

WQ: Well, I think there was a couple of things. One, when I became the territorial governor, I was very uneasy about it because I had felt very strongly that the president shouldn't—we should have a voice in our own selection. And so here I was, all of sudden, thrust into the very position without the choice of the people that I was representing, and I really made an extra effort in those two years to go all over the territory and to meet all of the people, and to try to give them a feeling that, even though they hadn't selected me, I was really representing them and not representing Uncle Sam's government in Washington.

I guess the other part of it—and so therefore, I think I had done more than maybe Jack and his supporters thought I had. And part of that then was that the ILWU, which was a very

strong supporter of Jack's, and very strong then, particularly on the neighbor islands. And in that 1959 election, they didn't think I had a chance. And therefore, I had a lot of friends in the ILWU on the neighbor islands, all of whom had their Quinn signs in their yards, and they went out working for me, and nobody interfered with them. And next thing you knew, I was strong in the neighbor islands and I won. Nineteen sixty-two came along, the same people came out to try to support me, and they were very quickly disciplined. And that was the difference—a difference.

CC: What about the whole question of the—what's known as the quote, unquote, Second Mahele issue?

WQ: That was a term that I cannot blame anybody but myself for. I had lots of ideas on the utilization of state lands, and I still do. And some of them have been put into practice, some of them were passed during my term as governor, but, like a fool, I was coming back from the Mainland, I was going to make a speech in Maui, and was thinking of something to call it. And that was the term, and it was a bad term. (Chuckles) And they were able to take that just as a slogan and use it against me. There was some publicity that had been put together in connection with it, one with fifty bucks an acre and that sort of thing, which was really not part of my program but was used as a promotion stunt, and it was a bad one.

CC: So you really felt that it came home to haunt you in the second campaign.

WQ: Yeah, I think, yes, it did. And I had to spend a lot of time explaining it. Although as I say, the basic concept was that you sell state lands for appropriate social purposes and sell them at an appraised value on a drawing by lot instead of letting people bid it up to whatever value. And we did that. We did that for the farmers in Lālāmilo, and we did it for the victims of the [Hilo] tidal wave, and we did it in several instances. But still, the term was a bad one.

CC: Let me get on a little lighter side. You remember any humorous stories about those campaigns, or the days before statehood involving yourself or Jack Burns, or some of the people who we all think about?

WQ: Oh, I don't know. When you ask me, suddenly, to say something funny, you know, that's a little difficult. (Chuckles) We had a good time. You and I talked earlier about Gardiner Jones, and one thing that I remember very well was when I was running for the first time—and this was in '56 for the territorial senate. Although I lost, I then was appointed [governor] because I'd run and run well in that campaign, I guess. But I'll never forget that. I was totally a neophyte in this whole political picture. And so, unlike the Republicans for the fifty years before me, I would go out, and I'd go into the public housing areas and so forth, and I'd knock on every door, you know, and say hello, and try to meet as many people as I could. And one day, Gardiner was writing for the *Advertiser*, thought that, well, this is that new kind of Republican. We haven't seen this sort of thing before. And he sent somebody out, and who was with me for the whole day. And they did a whole page in the Sunday *Advertiser*. You couldn't buy it [i.e., publicity] for anything, and I think that was probably one of the things that led to my being appointed governor.

CC: One other thing I've heard that if a speech didn't go so well for you, you could always sing a good Irish song. Do you remember that?

WQ: Well I did. I'll tell you how that started. Again, it started in that senatorial campaign which was '56. And one of the first rallies we went to was at 'Aiea Park. And we, the senatorial candidates, were at the very end of the program that time, so it was about eleven-thirty at night when we got up. And there was nobody there but the kids who were going to fold up the seats again, a few dogs, and the musicians, who always followed [us] around, and these were to follow on the Republican rallies. And so when I got up, I guess [George] Peppy Cooke got up first, and he had his guitarist with him, and they did the "Moloka'i March," or something. So I got up, and I turned to the girls, I said, "Does anybody sing 'Ke Kali Nei Au?'" Well they looked at me, you know, a little bit askance, but the soprano stepped forward. I said, "Key of C." So I sang it, just for our own amusement really. But then thereafter when I'd go to a rally, even if we're at the top of the program, I'd do my three minutes worth and this gal would step forward and hit the key of C, and we'd sing. So I sang at every rally, (chuckles) I think. But it was mostly, "Ke Kali Nei Au," not an Irish song.

CC: Oh, 'cause I remember an ILWU person told me, he remembered you singing, "When Irish Eyes are Smiling" at the end of a speech.

WQ: Yeah.

CC: What do you see today? What's in the future for Hawai'i, given twenty-five years of statehood, what do we have to look forward to for the future?

WQ: Well, I think statehood has proven itself a good thing. I think that the economic and social complexion of the state is changing, and maybe changing pretty rapidly now. In my day, I used to say that Hawai'i stood on four strong legs—sugar, pineapple, tourism, and federal spending, the way we call it, and that was the most important one then. Now, of course, tourism has taken over far and away, the leading export industry, if you will, since it brings dollars in. And sugar and pineapple and agriculture all lumped together. Sugar's going to have a bad time all the way through. I don't see any way in which we could just hope that all these lands will continue to be devoted to sugar because we continue to get some help and support from the federal government, it's vital. I think that there's an increase in agriculture—mixed varieties of agriculture. I think we're going to develop more and more export crops. I think fresh pineapple and fresh papaya—I hope we can overcome the problems with papaya—will continue to grow, I think ornamental plants, and things like that.

And I'm not one to say high tech [technology] is going to be the answer because every state is looking at that. But I think that if we can strengthen the University [of Hawai'i] and its leadership and focus the university in the areas in which it belongs, that that would gradually bring additional factors here. This is a great place to live, it's a great place for companies to have regional headquarters and so forth, just because it's so lovely.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: This is a continuation of the William Quinn statehood interview. Slight overlap.

WQ: This is a great place to live, it's a great place for companies to have regional headquarters and so forth, just because it's so lovely, but we've got to keep our university and school system up to warrant that. Now, I'm optimistic for the future of Hawai'i.

CC: Good, thank you.

JC: Okay, that is the end of all the Quinn interviews. Thank you very much.

END OF INTERVIEW

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